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In recent years, the philanthropic sector has neared consen-sus on the need to improve measurement and evaluation of its work. Although the philanthropies they lead use different methods, members of the Aspen Philanthropy Group (APG) 
have agreed that basic principles and practices can inform efforts 
to monitor performance, track progress, and assess the impact of 
foundation strategies, initiatives, and grants. They hope to build 
a culture of learning in the process. 
Over the past two years these CEOs of private, corporate, and 
community foundations have supported a series of meetings on mea-
surement and evaluation (M&E) with leaders of grantee organiza-
tions, issue experts, and evaluators. They have concluded that, when 
done right, assessment can achieve three goals. It can strengthen 
grantor and grantee decision-making, enable continuous learning 
and improvement, and contribute to field-wide learning. Below are 
broad observations from the workshop process, followed by articles 
from five APG authors describing the M&E philosophies of the in-
stitutions they lead. Their articles will be among those to appear 
in an edited e-volume, to be published by the Aspen Institute and 
continuously updated to capture evolving foundation practice and 
comments from voices in the field. This is what we learned.
Definitions Matter | APG members found that differing ter-
minology can undermine efforts by grantors and grantees to col-
laborate effectively in the design and implementation of an M&E 
system. Many grantors and grantees use the terms “evaluation,” 
“impact measurement,” and “measurement and evaluation” in-
terchangeably. In fact, M&E encompasses distinct activities with 
distinct purposes, methods, and levels of difficulty. In his article, 
William and Flora Hewlett Foundation president Paul Brest sepa-
rates M&E into three categories undertaken at three stages: theo-
ries of change described and logic models devised during the ini-
tial design of a project or foundation initiative; tracking progress 
against the strategy set during the life of the grant or initiative; 
and assessing impact after the fact. The first of these is essential 
background for M&E, and the three together provide a useful 
means of organizing the various activities and purposes of M&E. 
The second enables a grantor and grantee to gain the information 
needed to make mid-course corrections to the strategy and learn 
throughout the process. The third activity—assessing impact—is 
the most daunting. Brest notes that in some undertakings, such 
as policy advocacy or Track II diplomacy, exogenous influences 
Framing the Issue
By Jane Wales
make it hard if not impossible to attribute impact to any one actor 
or strategy. He argues for demonstrating “contribution” rather 
than claiming “attribution,” where contribution means increasing 
the likelihood of success, and notes that the true impact of such 
“risky” grants may not be possible to ascertain. Nonetheless, they 
are well worth pursuing.
Purpose Matters | At its best, M&E informs decision-making 
and provides for continuous learning. In his article, Matthew Ban-
nick, managing director of Omidyar Network (ON), discusses why 
M&E is more likely to be used—and used to good effect—when it is 
designed collaboratively by grantor and grantee, and when data 
are gathered and organized around decisions that each needs to 
take. It is therefore critically important that they agree on their 
evaluation approach at the outset. Ford Foundation president Luis 
Ubiñas agrees, adding that “from the very beginning, grantees 
should have a clear sense of what benchmarks of success are ex-
pected of them at each stage of initiative development”—and why. 
The Cost-Benefit Ratio Matters | Ubiñas points out the costs 
of M&E, arguing that in designing an evaluation system, careful 
consideration must be given to the burdens on each party. Failure 
to do so, he writes, can lead to “excessive data gathering” in which 
grantor and grantee gather as much data as possible in search of 
evidence of impact. The costs are fourfold. “First, it is a burden 
to grantees, creating surplus work for often tightly staffed and 
financially strapped nonprofits. Second, it undermines quality 
because grantees will provide the requested information to meet 
their grant obligations, but may not have time to supply the in-
sight that is often more valuable than the data. Third, it inundates 
foundation staff with information but may leave them little time 
to use it effectively. Fourth, it may not provide the information 
that is actually needed to understand how effective our initiatives 
and grantmaking are.” According to Bannick, ON reduces the 
burden by using a limited number of easily collected metrics, and, 
as an alternative to the “time-consuming, costly, and complicated 
challenge of measuring impact,” ON often measures outputs as 
proxies. As for the price tag, Rockefeller Foundation president 
Judith Rodin notes the efficiencies gained by using technology 
to gather real time data. Brest notes (in Money Well Spent, co-
authored with Hal Harvey) that “if you are a philanthropist with 
a long-term commitment to a field, it is well worth putting your 
funds—and lots of them—into evaluation.”
Culture, Context, and Capacity Matter | M&E requires a commit-
ment to building capacity within foundations, grantee organizations, 
and the field of evaluation in general. The Rockefeller Foundation 
invests in M&E teams in both the developed and developing world 
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to monitor foundation initiatives and to act as “critical friends” to 
its grantees, establishing monitoring and learning systems where 
none existed. The goal is to facilitate learning among grantees and 
within the foundation aimed at improving performance all round. 
But most important, it is to leave behind greater capacity among 
local M&E professionals. Rodin reports that the foundation has 
supported regional institutions that train and mentor local evalua-
tors and partner with similar institutions elsewhere, with the goal 
of building lasting capacity. Bannick speaks to the importance of 
providing technical assistance to grantees. And, within a founda-
tion, James Irvine Foundation president James Canales notes, it 
is important for there to be leadership by trustees and senior of-
ficers, as well as a readiness to devote time, dollars, and expertise 
to assessing the philanthropy’s strategy, initiatives, and grants. 
Doing so “mandates full institutional commitment and cannot be 
the province of just the evaluation director.” Beyond these impor-
tant tangible contributions lies the requirement for building what 
Ubiñas calls an “impact culture” in which continuous learning and 
adaptation are enabled, required, and rewarded. “Goals, theories 
of change, and operating approaches are all necessarily imperfect; 
only by learning from our successes and our mistakes can we build 
an impact culture,” he writes. 
The Unit of Analysis Matters | The good—and the bad—news 
is that almost any activity can be evaluated. It is important to sort 
out the different units of analysis, as is done in the Bill and Melinda 
Gates Foundation’s Guide to Actionable Measurement, which notes 
three distinct areas of focus. At the level of foundation strategy, the 
focus should be on measuring outcomes over impact (as Bannick 
describes), on assessing contribution rather than attribution (as Brest 
recommends for certain grants), and on the degree of harmony that 
can be achieved among grantees pursuing a given strategy. At the 
level of foundation initiative, the foundation should use grantee re-
porting data on outputs and outcomes to signal whether the initia-
tive is making progress; track the program team’s activities other 
than grants (such as convening and public speaking); use indepen-
dent evaluation; and capture both intended and unintended con-
sequences of the initiative. And at the level of the individual grant, 
the foundation should align expected grant results with strategic 
intent; work with the grantee to track grantee inputs, activities, 
outputs and outcomes at critical points to manage and adjust each 
grant appropriately; and measure the foundation’s input of human, 
financial and technical resources. 
Timing Matters | Just as the units of analysis differ, so too do the 
time horizons required to measure and evaluate the performance of 
a foundation’s strategy and grants. Many short and medium-term 
metrics are useful in assessing how well an organization is managing 
processes or reaching target populations. Longer-term longitudinal 
studies are critical to gauging the impact of a program and to estab-
lishing the causal relationship between intervention and desired out-
come. Such rigorous, long-term studies can be particularly useful for 
those seeking to scale up innovations. Canales notes, however, that 
the annual grant-cycle poses a “structural barrier” to the longer-term 
undertaking of evaluating and learning, noting that “program goals 
and aspirations rarely follow annual timelines, nor should they...if 
they are sufficiently ambitious.” He points to the importance of “cre-
ating the space for consideration of broader progress assessment.”
Feedback from Grantees and Beneficiaries Matters | M&E 
must incorporate into the process the viewpoints and observa-
tions of the funder, grantee, and ultimate beneficiary through all 
stages of work—identifying problems, co-creating solutions, and 
implementing with a shared vision of outcomes. Under the leader-
ship of APG member Carol Larson, the David and Lucile Packard 
Foundation solicits feedback from the on-the-ground staff of the 
grantee and has established written standards to help its program 
team to communicate with grantees. Grantees, in turn, can bet-
ter assess community needs—and their performance in helping 
to meet those needs—when program beneficiaries provide them 
quantitative and qualitative feedback. At Ford, Ubiñas notes that 
the foundation selects grantees “managed by those living and 
working closest to where targeted populations are located.” Noting 
the Rockefeller Foundation’s commitment to evaluation practices 
that include stakeholders’ voices, Rodin cites the consensus of 
the Africa Evaluation Association: “only when the voices of those 
whose lives we seek to improve are heard, respected and internal-
ized in our understanding of the problems we seek to solve” will 
philanthropy achieve its purpose. 
Transparency Matters | Although the goals of M&E are to in-
form decision-making and enable continuous learning by those 
immediately involved, there is a larger community to serve and 
a larger purpose to pursue. By publicly sharing the data gathered 
and conclusions reached, grantors and grantees can contribute to 
field-wide learning. APG members agree that this is an opportunity 
to seize. The philanthropic sector has helped build communities of 
practice that generate knowledge. These evaluators form profes-
sional associations that set standards for the field. Independent 
organizations assess foundation and grantee performance and 
publish their findings. Donor organizations and networks trans-
fer knowledge among philanthropies, and between grant-making 
institutions and individuals. And academic programs provide 
the intellectual underpinning for much of this work. Supported 
by philanthropy, these and other institutions provide some of the 
early hardware for wider impact. Moreover, the gradual evolution 
of principles that guide and practices that enable rigorous evalu-
ation can contribute to its software.
But has a true system for philanthropic impact been designed 
and widely adopted? Perhaps not. And so, in publishing an e-volume 
and opening a conversation, Aspen’s Program on Philanthropy 
and Social Innovation will seek the wisdom of the crowd and ask 
the questions: What might the components of such a system be? 
Where will the breakthroughs occur? What sort of venture capital 
will be needed to finance the prototypes? And what markets will 
bring these innovations to scale? Or, building upon Ubiñas’s apt 
phrase, under what conditions might an “impact culture” spread? 
What would it take for its language to be adopted, its standards 
embraced, its methods refined, and its potential realized? And if 
that culture is to be global, dynamic, and enduring, how might 
it be informed and advanced by the new cadre of evaluators to 
which Rodin refers?
None of the architects or beneficiaries of modern-day philan-
thropy would claim that they alone can create such a world, but they 
may well agree that it is one worth imagining. Doing so together 
would make for a powerful beginning. s
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making a difference by delivering the results 
we seek? To truly maximize impact, foun-
dations must work to build results-focused 
cultures that embed internally the risks and 
demands faced by our grantees, and demand 
of ourselves the same level of performance 
demanded of grantees.
At the Ford Foundation, we continually 
work to answer these challenges. We make 
long-term investments, understanding 
that patient capital and well-reasoned risk 
are required to chart bold new solutions to 
complex social problems. Our goals are cen-
tered on social justice principles that rec-
ognize the inherent dignity of all people. In 
accordance with these principles, the foun-
dation’s work seeks to ensure that social 
systems and institutions give all people a 
voice in decisions that affect their lives, and 
the opportunity to reach their full potential. 
This is far-reaching and essential work, but 
it is also, by nature, difficult to evaluate.
Our challenge, then, has been to create 
a culture focused on results within the Ford 
Foundation without sacrificing either our 
ambitious objectives or our commitment 
to maintaining certain core principles as 
we pursue those objectives. In building and 
fostering a results-focused culture, the Ford 
Foundation is guided by five principles: 
1. Create a clear and focused strategic 
vision.
2. Allocate resources on a differentiated 
and dynamic basis.
3. Build accountability based on clearly 
delineated roles and responsibilities.
4. Put a premium on deep and effective 
listening.
5. Implement a results-focused culture 
across the entire organization.
Realizing these fundamental principles 
in an organization’s culture is no simple un-
Philanthropic organizations confront some of the most exigent and endur-ing problems facing humankind. Our mission-driven organizations 
pursue broad societal goals, including reduc-
ing poverty, advancing human rights, foster-
ing educational achievement, and strength-
ening democratic principles and processes. 
Pursuing these goals is a long-term commit-
ment, requiring aggressive problem solving, 
sustained effort, and firm resolve.
Our philanthropic resources are excep-
tionally modest when measured against the 
depth of the social and economic challenges 
we tackle. And in a volatile economic cli-
mate, philanthropic leaders must be highly 
disciplined in managing limited resources. 
The need for strategic and effective philan-
thropic effort is further heightened by the 
unprecedented pace of change brought 
about by the seemingly limitless techno-
logical innovation of our time.
Now more than ever, results matter, and 
how we as philanthropic leaders define, pro-
mote and reinforce a commitment to results 
in the culture of our organizations can pro-
foundly affect whether or not our collective 
mission to make a difference in people’s lives 
succeeds. A results-focused culture must be 
predicated on an institution-wide commit-
ment to clearly defined objectives pursued 
with strategic clarity and supported by dy-
namic resource allocation. Results can only 
be defined by end outcomes to the communi-
ties we are serving. Process or activity-based 
results are valuable on an interim basis, but 
the results that matter are the results that are 
felt by people in need. How do we understand, 
in appropriate timeframes, whether we are 
A Focus on Culture
How the Ford Foundation is engaging its global staff in building a shared culture of results
By luis a. uBiñas
LuIS A. uBIñAS is president of the Ford Foundation. 
Before joining the foundation in 2008, he was a director 
at McKinsey & Co., leading the firm’s media practice on 
the West Coast.
dertaking. It requires comfort with uncer-
tainty and risk, and openness to elements of 
accountability that at times call for signifi-
cant shifts in perspective. It demands that we 
continually ask ourselves, at every stage of 
our work and at all levels of the organization: 
Are we making as great a difference as we 
can for the communities and people we are 
entrusted with serving? Is there anything 
we can learn—and change—to achieve the 
maximum results? And how do we define 
what constitutes results for the range of 
work and goals to which we are committed?
CReAte A CLeAR And FOCuSed 
StRAtegIC VISIOn
A culture focused on results begins with a 
clear understanding of objectives and the 
development of strategies to achieve them. 
During my first year as president of the Ford 
Foundation, the global program team and 
I went through a comprehensive review of 
our grantmaking, motivated by the desire to 
bring focus and clarity to our work. We iden-
tified a core set of social justice issues that 
together constitute a cogent way to be true 
to the foundation’s mission. For each issue 
we set clearly defined goals and strategies, 
developed theories of change for achieving 
them, and designed operating approaches 
for working day-to-day. The results of this 
effort can be seen on our website, which 
provides a visual map of our grantmaking 
objectives and strategies and directly links 
them to the nonprofit and nongovernmental 
efforts we are supporting.
The second phase of the effort was to 
determine the scale of resources required 
to achieve each strategy. Focusing our 
resources meant we increased the aver-
age funding of initiatives from just over $1 
million to more than $10 million each. We 
brought the same kind of depth and concen-
tration to our staffing, moving from indi-
Sponsored Supplement to SSIR
5  
AdvANCiNg EvALUAtioN PRACtiCEs iN PHiLANtHRoPy 
vidual pursuit of initiatives to a team-based 
approach. Perhaps most important, we were 
able to thoughtfully deploy the foundation’s 
non-grant resources, including field lead-
ership, public and private sector partner-
ships, communications, and convening 
capabilities. Direct financial support, our 
traditional staple, became only one part of 
the portfolio of tools the foundation could 
mobilize to address a problem or challenge 
once a strategic vision had been set.
One example of the results that can be 
achieved by combining non-grant resources 
with financial resources is JustFilms, a new 
Ford Foundation effort to advance social jus-
tice through the creative lens of emerging 
and established documentary filmmakers. 
Although the foundation has been a leading 
funder of social justice documentaries for 
decades, supporting landmark films such as 
Eyes on the Prize, this effort is harnessing the 
power of film to create a national and global 
dialogue on social justice issues.
Our first step was to identify clear, fo-
cused outcomes that could be thoughtfully 
assessed, such as growing a new cadre of 
filmmakers, bringing social justice films to 
market at strategic moments that maximize 
awareness and social change, helping films 
find an audience, and connecting new works 
to a global network of social change makers 
and movements. Evaluating how we were 
meeting these objectives required us sub-
sequently to change our strategy, more than 
tripling our funding from under $3 million 
annually to more than $10 million annually 
to support our aspirations; establishing a 
creative collaboration with two leading film 
organizations, the Sundance Institute and 
the Tribeca Film Festival; and assigning 
two dedicated, full-time, high-level and 
experienced foundation staff members to 
direct the initiative. In its first year, Just-
Films had more films in the 2012 Sundance 
Film Festival’s documentary competition 
than any other producer, and one of our 
films won the award for Best Documentary.
ALLOCAte ReSOuRCeS In A dIFFeR-
entIAted And dynAmIC mAnneR
With clear objectives, strategies, and op-
erating approaches in place, the central 
question we asked was what scale of re-
sources was required for each strategy to 
effectively achieve the results required. 
From the start, the foundation allocated 
resources—financial, staff, and other, such 
as public voice—according to the nature 
and scale of its objectives. We change that 
allocation dynamically, on the basis of stra-
tegic need. As a result, the level of resources 
can vary greatly across initiatives and over 
time. Through ongoing assessments, we 
engage in a dialogue with program staff 
about whether our investments should be 
augmented to achieve significant results, or 
reduced to allow for future exploration and 
course correction. This process creates a 
dynamic internal marketplace of ideas and 
information that informs the evolution of 
our grantmaking strategies.
For example, using results-based strate-
gic assessment and adjustment recently al-
lowed us to launch a $200 million investment 
to help shift the approach of urban develop-
ment from one focused on isolated areas of 
urban need to one focused on regional solu-
tions that link potential workers to centers of 
employment and housing. The goal is now 
to tie economic opportunities to communi-
ties in need through better transportation, 
housing, and zoning policies.
Once initial resources are allocated in 
a differentiated way, we immediately face 
the question of how to reallocate resources 
as initiatives evolve, succeed, and, fail. A 
results-focused culture must integrate 
course-correction methods, acknowledg-
ing successes and failures and adjusting 
resources accordingly. This process begins 
by answering five important questions:
1. Does the initiative or field office have 
a clearly defined strategy and ap-
proach with explicit and achievable 
objectives that can be documented 
and evaluated?
2. Can additional funding for a defined 
period deepen or hasten desired re-
sults over time in an initiative or office?
A culture focused on results begins with a 
clear understanding of objectives and the  
development of strategies to achieve them. 
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3. Are the funds currently allocated be-
ing deployed strategically? Have pe-
ripheral activities been eliminated?
4. To what extent has the initiative team 
successfully engaged other partners, 
including other foundations, busi-
nesses, and government?
5. Is the initiative team strategically using 
the foundation’s non-grant resources—
intellectual, convening, and communi-
cations—to pursue the initiative’s goals?
The answers to these questions help 
guide decisions about which initiatives are 
best positioned to deploy additional funds 
strategically, as well as which ones require 
additional funds to achieve more significant 
results. But the answers may also lead to a 
decision to change course or to end activities.
It is essential to use the same differen-
tiated, dynamic approach in the allocation 
of staff and other non-grant resources that 
add value beyond direct financial support. 
One example is the strategic use of commu-
nications—a core resource that is often left 
out of the results equation. Each strategy 
must consider if and how the use of com-
munications activities is critical to achiev-
ing its desired goal. At the Ford Foundation, 
we think about the deployment of external 
communications assets—how we allocate 
the foundation’s voice—very carefully as 
an integral part of how we work.
Achieving results often pivots on our 
ability to communicate effectively and 
strategically about promising solutions to 
complex challenges that are effective and 
realistic. An early example came in Novem-
ber 2010, when a critical mass of people 
gathered in Cancun, Mexico, for the United 
Nations Climate Change Conference. The 
Ford Foundation, along with our grantees, 
saw this convening as an opportunity to 
raise the profile of community forestry in 
Mexico—a little known but significant suc-
cess story in cutting greenhouse gases. A 
foundation-supported media campaign 
offered journalists a chance to visit com-
munity forestry sites in Mexico, generat-
ing important media coverage before and 
during the conference. To complement this 
effort, I authored an opinion article, which 
ran in US and Mexican media, on the need 
to invest in sustainable forestry programs 
that respect and promote community 
stewardship. Using the foundation’s public 
voice continues to be a critical asset toward 
achieving results in our work in commu-
nity forestry and other grantmaking areas.
BuILd In ACCOuntABILIty BASed 
On CLeARLy deLIneAted ROLeS 
And ReSPOnSIBILItIeS
Clearly defining roles and responsibili-
ties is central to a results-focused culture. 
For senior management, this kind of clar-
ity—complementary to clarity in strategy 
and approach—supports the robust level 
of oversight and partnership that is vital 
to effectively align resources with goals. 
Clarity about responsibilities is an essential 
precursor to accountability.
At the Ford Foundation, we have expanded 
and defined the role of directors to give them 
explicit responsibility for initiatives. On aver-
age, a director oversees three initiatives, su-
pervising their teams and budgets. Our repre-
sentatives lead the work in our many regional 
offices, collaborating with primarily, though 
not exclusively, New York City-based direc-
tors to determine which of our initiatives are 
most needed in a specific geographic area and 
to ensure that initiatives are implemented ef-
fectively. Although many people are involved 
in grantmaking, responsibility for outcomes 
in a particular initiative or geographic area 
sits squarely with the team of directors and 
representatives involved.
Our expectations of grantees are high. 
We demand the best from them, and as 
foundation leaders we need to demand the 
best from ourselves as well. Every member 
of the Ford Foundation’s staff, from senior 
leadership to the newest hire, is expected to 
recognize that being part of the organiza-
tion means holding himself or herself to the 
highest standard in ensuring results. Each 
staff person must know that, like grantees, 
she or he is accountable for results.
Tying external results to internal out-
comes is central to the development of a re-
sults-focused culture. In every organization, 
high performance can be driven by rewards 
and incentives. In the for-profit sector this 
often takes the form of increasing economic 
rewards. Nonprofit organizations and foun-
dations have a different model but must be 
no less committed to creating a culture that 
rewards performance and contribution to 
forwarding the mission. It is critical to ac-
knowledge high performers who achieve 
disproportionate results—innovative leaders 
who foster internal and external innovation, 
build movements, and establish national 
and international dialogues as a new norm. 
Our ability to reward such high performers 
is no less powerful than in the private sector 
because we can provide the added resources 
that these leaders need to deepen their work.
At the same time, any culture that focuses 
on performance results and standards of ac-
countability must have an equally strong 
organizational commitment to staff devel-
opment. Philanthropic organizations must 
invest in building the skills and organiza-
tional tools needed to evaluate progress 
for each initiative and for each individual 
grantmaker—indeed, for every member of 
the staff, from administrative assistants to 
the president. Every willing staffer has the 
potential to be a change leader.
An important caveat, as we think about 
results, is the need to remain aware of the 
risky nature of our work. Many of our most 
important initiatives are extraordinarily 
demanding, and their outcomes are highly 
uncertain. We face the challenge of main-
taining high standards of accountability in 
an environment where speculative inno-
vation is encouraged and often necessary. 
In a results-focused culture, it is critical 
for leaders to make positive use of noble, 
well-planned, and well-executed efforts 
that nonetheless were not able to succeed, 
recognizing and understanding that failure 
is often the potent seed of future success.
Put A PRemIum On deeP  
And eFFeCtIVe LIStenIng
A results-focused culture puts a premium 
on listening. At the Ford Foundation, we 
know that our grantees have the deepest 
We believe that our early effort to define  
and instill a culture of results has relevance 
for other foundations, both large and small.
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understanding of the issues that affect the 
people they serve. That is why we support 
initiatives managed by those living and 
working closest to where targeted prob-
lems are located. We recognize the critical 
need to maintain a rich dialogue with our 
grantees and others in the fields and com-
munities in which we work.
The Ford Foundation’s worldwide net-
work of offices is designed to help us real-
ize this aspiration by fostering both face-
to-face and virtual meetings. In a typical 
year, in our New York City offices alone, we 
host more than 20,000 visitors who come 
together with our teams to work on existing 
initiatives and to explore new ones. Invest-
ing time in listening and learning enables 
us to make real-time strategic adjustments 
and to plan highly informed future direc-
tions. This emphasis on listening, in turn, 
enables us to improve how we are working, 
and demands of ourselves the same excel-
lence we demand of our grantees.
Deep and effective listening is more about 
shared dialogue than information gathering. 
Traditional reporting and data collection can 
sometimes be excessive and ultimately unin-
formative or misleading, at times yielding ad-
versarial relationships with grantees rather 
than a constructive collaboration. Excessive 
data gathering has several costs. First, it is a 
burden to grantees, creating surplus work for 
often tightly staffed and financially strapped 
nonprofits. Second, it undermines quality, 
because grantees will provide the requested 
information to meet their grant obligations, 
but may not have time to supply the insight 
that is often more valuable than this form of 
data. Third, it inundates foundation staff with 
information but may leave them little time to 
use it effectively. Fourth, it may not provide 
the information that is actually needed to 
understand how effective our initiatives and 
grantmaking are.
Data reporting and design do play an 
important role in building a culture of re-
sults, but just as resources must be stra-
tegically targeted, so too must reporting 
requirements be focused and shaped by 
certain basic principles. The information 
and indicators collected must be aligned 
with program goals and strategies to ef-
fectively show whether an activity is on 
the forecasted path or has deviated from it. 
From the very beginning, grantees should 
have a clear sense of what benchmarks of 
success are expected of them at each stage 
of initiative development. Such information 
and indicators are not exclusively or always 
quantified or quantifiable. Therefore we 
must be creative in articulating what kind 
of information will allow us to make these 
assessments and subsequent decisions.
The skill of deep listening is vital not 
only to our individual initiatives, but to our 
organization as a whole. It is a central part 
of the culture anchored in our initial strat-
egy-setting effort. At the Ford Foundation, 
we engaged more than 4,000 grantees and 
other experts in our strategy-resetting effort 
in 2008, and we believe every one of them 
played a role in reshaping and revitalizing 
our work. Goals, theories of change, and 
operating approaches are all necessarily 
imperfect; only by learning from our suc-
cesses and our mistakes can we build an ef-
fective culture of results. Our objective, as 
we listen to grantees and others, should not 
be merely to gather data and evaluate others 
but to learn about ourselves and to evolve. 
ImPLement A ReSuLtS-FOCuSed 
CuLtuRe ACROSS the entIRe 
ORgAnIzAtIOn
Leading a foundation is a complex task. At 
the Ford Foundation, we make more than 
$500 million in grants and contribute to 
change in a range of other ways, from pro-
viding individual and team leadership, to 
bringing voice and convening, to building 
awareness and partnerships. But excellence 
in these dimensions does not adequately 
define a results-focused culture.
Our success in implementing and sup-
porting program initiatives depends on 
the foundation’s outstanding day-to-day 
operations and exceptional endowment 
management, and consequently we have 
worked hard to ensure that our culture of 
results reaches beyond the program team 
to include all staff. A philanthropic orga-
nization must bring to all of its operations 
the same level of rigor that it uses to define 
strategy, allocate resources, gather informa-
tion, and evaluate results.
More than $100 million of the founda-
tion’s 2011-grantmaking was the direct re-
sult of the changes we made in operations 
and endowment management in 2008 and 
2009. For example, shifting $40 million 
from internal operating costs to external 
grantmaking in 2009 enabled us to launch 
and fully fund the programs discussed in 
this article. In addition, careful stewardship 
of our endowment—including changing our 
allocation of funds and the management of 
those allocations—has allowed it to fully 
recover the investment losses that resulted 
from the economic downturn. The decrease 
in our endowment that has occurred since 
the beginning of the recession is now exclu-
sively the result of our grantmaking activity.
WhAt We hAVe LeARned
The Ford Foundation has a complex global 
footprint and a broad scope. Nonetheless, 
we believe that our early effort to define 
and instill a culture of results has relevance 
for other foundations, both large and small. 
The lessons we have learned over the last 
several years and the five principles we 
have put in place have charted a well-de-
fined course for the foundation.
Although the five principles are now 
clear, nothing about our endeavor to build 
a culture of results has been easy. Listening 
means hearing criticism as well as praise; 
dynamic resource allocation often means 
making hard and even painful choices; and 
a commitment to accountability means 
taking responsibility for performance or-
ganizationally and individually. But when 
we consider the benefits of this carefully 
developed approach—a greater ability to 
help the people we serve—we think they far 
outweigh the challenges of implementation.
As the president of the Ford Foundation, 
leading a results-focused culture is a con-
stantly evolving challenge. Very little is static. 
Strategies change and resources shift as 
strategic need and results demand. Account-
ability is maintained, based on individual and 
team performance. Grantees and others need 
to be continuously engaged and heard.
A culture focused on results is not al-
ways comfortable—it has many of the 
stresses of a marketplace that demands ef-
fectiveness and efficiency. In a time defined 
by technological change and economic dis-
continuity, however, we have no choice but 
to demand the most of ourselves. Cultural 
transformation is, undeniably, hard work, 
but the rewards of such an endeavor are 
great. Any leader trying to achieve strategic 
results at a foundation or nonprofit should 
consider the hard-won but invaluable ben-
efits of building a culture that fosters, rein-
forces, and rewards that goal. s
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Learning from  
Silicon Valley
How the Omidyar Network uses a venture capital model to measure and evaluate effectiveness 
By Matt Bannick & eric Hallstein  
When visitors step out of the elevator at the Omidyar Network (ON) office in Redwood City, Calif., the 
first thing they see is a quotation on the wall: 
“Every person has the power to make a dif-
ference.” A belief in the fundamental value 
and power of each individual shapes nearly 
every facet of ON, the philanthropic invest-
ment firm created and funded in 2004 by 
eBay founder Pierre Omidyar and his wife, 
Pam. At ON, we strive to create opportuni-
ties for individuals to unlock this power.
ON’s approach to measurement and eval-
uation is inseparable from our approach to 
philanthropy. We start with the notion that 
unlocking the potential of individuals is an 
indispensable way to improve the world. 
Given opportunities, people will tap their 
talents to improve their lives and conse-
quently, the lives of our families and com-
munities, which ultimately benefits society 
more broadly.
Omidyar Network strives to scale up in-
novation by applying many of the best prac-
tices from the venture capital industry to 
philanthropy. In rapidly changing markets, 
we believe the truly game-changing innova-
tions will emerge from entrepreneurs who 
are empowered to identify changing situa-
tions and rapidly adapt their organizations. 
Our investment model is to invest in and 
then help scale up innovative nonprofit and 
for-profit organizations with the potential 
to create opportunity for hundreds of thou-
sands or millions of people. Instead of fund-
ing others to implement programs related to 
our strategy, we seek to enable entrepreneurs 
to identify—and iterate on—their own strate-
gies for creating social impact. 
 
meASuRement And eVALuAtIOn
ON has tried many approaches to mea-
surement and evaluation over the last few 
years, and from that experience we are 
convinced that an organization’s approach 
to measurement and evaluation must flow 
from its investment model. ON’s approach 
is to conduct an up-front, detailed due dili-
gence process to assess an organization’s 
potential and decide whether to invest. We 
then develop trusted partnerships with our 
investees to measure their progress in real 
time and provide additional, non-financial 
support as appropriate.
ON provides grants to nonprofit organi-
zations and invests debt and equity capital in 
for-profit ventures. ON is an impact investor 
whose bottom line is social value. We take a 
systems view; we are driven by the problem 
that needs to be solved and have the flex-
ibility to tailor the highest impact solution 
using the most appropriate type of capital.
Philanthropy through grants can benefit 
society in many ways. Grants can help non-
profits provide pure public goods. For exam-
ple, the free legal tools offered by Creative 
Commons, which allow content creators 
to grant copyright permissions to creative 
work, increase the amount of content avail-
able to the public for sharing. Grants can help 
subsidize goods and services that produce 
positive societal outcomes but are undersup-
plied by the market. For example, Endeavor 
is helping to transform emerging markets by 
supporting entrepreneurs. Grants can help 
disadvantaged populations that are unable 
to participate in the market, as Landesa and 
other property rights organizations do. And 
grants can spur investments in high-risk 
ventures, as they did with the initial develop-
ment of the microfinance industry.
Philanthropy through for-profit ven-
tures, in contrast, can benefit society by 
leveraging the power of markets. When the 
primary motive is to generate profits, busi-
nesses will strive to deliver value in excess 
of costs and scale up. Customer willingness 
to pay for a product or service not only in-
dicates value creation, but also serves as a 
valuable feedback mechanism.
ON has found that grants and for-profit 
investments can play complementary roles 
in delivering social impact, even, or maybe 
particularly, in difficult socioeconomic 
environments. Socially responsible grant 
capital can help potentially high-impact in-
novation gain market traction, and for-profit 
equity and debt capital can then help that 
idea scale up.
The phenomenal growth of microfinance 
is a good example of such complementary 
roles. Since 2004, ON has invested more 
than $100 million in 26 microfinance orga-
nizations: 15 nonprofits and 11 for-profits. 
In the 1980s and 1990s, most microfinance 
institutions were grant-funded NGOs. As mi-
crofinance’s impact and commercial viability 
became apparent, business investors—many 
with strong social motivations—invested 
heavily in commercial microfinance institu-
tions, helping them grow rapidly. According 
mAtt BAnnICk is managing partner at Omidyar 
Network, where he leads all aspects of the philanthropic 
investment firm’s strategy and operations. Before joining 
Omidyar, Bannick was president of PayPal and president 
of eBay International.
eRIC hALLSteIn is a vice president at Imprint Capital 
Markets and a venture partner at CalCEF Clean Energy 
Angel Fund. He was previously director of investments at 
Omidyar Network.
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to a 2009 Monitor Institute study, the per-
centage of the world’s top 50 microfinance 
institutions that were for-profit banks in-
creased from 22 percent to 62 percent be-
tween 1998 and 2008. In other words, grants 
sparked and nurtured microfinance, and 
for-profit capital helped it scale up.
ON takes equity stakes in for-profit com-
panies and typically provides negotiated 
general operating support to nonprofit or-
ganizations. This support gives organiza-
tions great flexibility to change their tactics 
and reallocate their resources in response to 
new information or changing market condi-
tions. It also enables them to invest in critical 
overhead functions, such as developing man-
agement talent and information technology, 
which may otherwise not get funded because 
these functions are not directly related to 
delivering specific programs.
A grant or investment is only the begin-
ning of ON’s relationship with our portfolio 
organizations. Although vital for growth, 
scale, and capacity, money alone cannot 
solve every problem or bring about the posi-
tive social impact we seek. Pierre and Pam 
Omidyar’s vision was to create an organiza-
tion that augments the impact of its financial 
investments by deploying human capital and 
leveraging the knowledge, expertise, and in-
novation of all those involved in solving the 
world’s most challenging problems.
When requested by a portfolio organi-
zation, ON’s human capital team provides 
strategy, governance, and leadership as-
sistance tailored to meet the grantee’s or 
investee’s needs. The team also creates 
opportunities for its investees to tap the 
power of the network by regularly organiz-
ing forums for them to exchange informa-
tion and share best practices. 
SeLeCtIOn CRIteRIA And  
due dILIgenCe
ON’s investment selection criteria and pro-
cess provide a foundation for measurement 
and evaluation of our investments. To make 
investment decisions, we consider factors 
such as innovation, scalability, and viability 
of business or revenue models. ON encour-
ages nonprofit investees to develop earned-
income streams whenever possible. Earned 
income is often a powerful tool for ensuring 
that a nonprofit focuses on understanding its 
constituents (customers); benefits from clear, 
market-based signals about the value of its 
product or service; and delivers products 
and services with values exceeding costs.
Like traditional venture capital firms, 
ON performs extensive due diligence be-
fore investing in an organization. Although 
traditional approaches to measurement 
and evaluation do not view due diligence 
as evaluation, organization-wide, up-front 
due diligence is central to our approach. In 
considering a funding investment, we care-
fully assess the organization’s management 
team, operational planning and governance, 
target market and competition, technology, 
product or service, and financials. We meet 
with the organization’s management team; 
interview customers, key channel partners, 
and board members; read industry and peer-
reviewed reports; and analyze company fi-
nancial and operating data. 
The due diligence process is primarily 
about whether to invest, but it also affords 
an opportunity to explore strategically im-
portant issues that ultimately help ON sup-
port an organization. Detailed discussions 
with an organization’s management team 
help to ensure strategic alignment between 
ON and the investee. During this process 
the management team and ON agree on 
the metrics that will be used to evaluate the 
organization’s progress. Due diligence also 
helps ON determine how best to use its hu-
man capital to support an organization. Thus 
the diligence process has a direct bearing on 
all subsequent measurement and evaluation.
ReACh And engAgement
ON, like all philanthropic funders, consid-
ers social impact the single most important 
investment criterion. Although our specific 
metrics vary across sectors and organiza-
tions, we have developed two overarching 
metrics that help us understand the social 
impact of portfolio organizations: reach 
and engagement. Reach is a measure of how 
many individuals are touched by a product 
or service. Engagement is a measure of the 
depth of that interaction.
Take for example the nonprofit Wikime-
dia Foundation, which operates Wikipedia. 
Wikipedia engages hundreds of millions 
of people in creating educational content, 
sharing information, and learning online. 
In 2010, a measure of Wikipedia’s reach was 
the roughly 400 million different people who 
visited its website. A measure of engagement 
was the 13 minutes that an average visi-
tor spent visiting Wikipedia every month. 
Other measures of reach and engagement 
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for Wikipedia include the number of active 
contributors of content and the level of their 
activity on the site.
Neither the reach nor engagement metric 
directly measures Wikipedia’s social impact, 
however. To determine impact we would need 
to understand the extent to which a product 
or service affects the end user. In this case, a 
potential impact metric for Wikipedia would 
be the improvement in students’ test scores 
after they use the site. Accurate estimation 
of Wikipedia’s impact would require an ex-
perimental or quasi-experimental approach, 
typically a randomized trial in the absence of 
a natural experiment, and might take months 
or even years to perform.
As an alternative to the time-consuming, 
costly, and complicated challenge of directly 
measuring impact, we often measure out-
puts—reach and engagement—as proxies 
for impact. Outputs are units of production, 
which often can be readily measured by an 
organization in the normal course of business.
Our use of a very limited number of eas-
ily collected metrics is a departure from 
some of our early evaluation frameworks 
in which we asked entrepreneurs to track 
as many as 18 different metrics. The earlier 
approaches not only were more costly to 
implement, but had less impact on invest-
ees’ success because neither they nor ON 
was able to prioritize appropriately.
We have learned that an organization’s 
social impact is best estimated using a com-
bination of reach and engagement metrics 
tailored to the industry, the organization’s 
business model, and its growth stage. Some 
organizations, such as Wikimedia, have wide 
reach and relatively limited personal engage-
ment. Other organizations, such as Endeavor, 
have modest reach and deep engagement. 
Selection of appropriate reach and engage-
ment metrics can be difficult and nuanced.
SCALABILIty And SOCIAL ImPACt
ON invests in highly scalable solutions with 
the potential to reach millions of people, 
and in which costs per unit generally de-
crease as the volume produced increases. 
Because organizations need a reliable 
revenue source to achieve scale, financial 
sustainability is a focus of our evaluation 
process—but there are some important dif-
ferences in how we think about financial 
sustainability in for-profits and nonprofits. 
For ON to consider investing in a for-
profit company, the critical first filter is its 
potential for positive social impact, and the 
second is its ability to profitably and quickly 
scale up. We look at financial metrics that 
are standard for a profit and loss statement, 
such as revenue, operating margin, and net 
income. In particular, operating income 
is a leading indicator of impact because it 
demonstrates a company’s ability to deliver 
value to customers above cost. 
In the for-profit organizations that ON 
funds, financial metrics are indicators of 
financial sustainability and social impact. 
A company’s revenue and margins are 
driven by the number of customers served 
and how highly those customers value the 
product, both of which provide a quantita-
tive measure of the opportunities a com-
pany is creating.
To supplement standard profit-and-loss 
measures, ON uses metrics captured by 
the company—typically, key performance 
indicators that a for-profit company tracks 
to understand the underlying drivers of 
its financial performance. At Bridge In-
ternational Academies, a Kenyan startup 
that operates a franchise-like network of 
low-cost, for-profit private schools, these 
metrics include the number of schools, the 
number of students and trained teachers, 
academic performance, and the turnover 
rate of students and teachers.
ReVenue StReAmS
In nonprofit organizations, social impact is 
the most important evaluation criterion, and 
we spend considerable time with investees 
to define reach and engagement metrics that 
measure it. We also encourage and work with 
nonprofit investees to develop diversified 
sources of revenue as well as to generate 
earned income and other revenue sources 
to increase their financial sustainability.
Earned income is valuable to nonprof-
its not only because it provides revenue to 
cover operating costs, but also because it is 
a conduit for clear, rapid, and market-based 
feedback about whether the organization is 
providing a highly valued product or ser-
vice. In this sense, not all revenue is equal. 
We view revenue tied to an organization’s 
products and services to be the highest value.
Similar to revenue and profit in for-profit 
organizations, market-based signals tied to 
products and services can be a powerful 
mechanism for getting nonprofit manage-
ment teams to prioritize the activities of 
highest value to the end user. Market-based 
feedback also is likely to be more useful and 
valuable for both ON and investees because 
it informs real-time decisions without wait-
ing for infrequent formal reviews.
For example, consider GuideStar, a non-
profit in which ON first invested in 2007. 
GuideStar offers information on 1.8 million 
US nonprofits and private foundations and 
had more than 10 million website visitors in 
2010. Although 98 percent of GuideStar data 
uses are free, users pay a fee for more so-
phisticated tools and services. Fee revenue 
covered 90 percent of GuideStar’s operating 
costs in 2010. Charging fees for premium 
services has given GuideStar resources to 
grow quickly and enabled its management 
team to focus on delivering high-quality 
services to paying customers rather than 
raising money through donations. Guide-
Star now uses foundation grants primarily 
for special projects and opportunities.
Several of ON’s portfolio organizations 
have developed innovative donation models 
that are a twist on the earned-income model. 
For example, DonorsChoose.org matches do-
nors with school classroom projects in need 
of support. When donors support a specific 
project, DonorsChoose.org invites them to 
contribute a small amount toward the costs 
of running the organization. In fiscal 2011, 
DonorsChoose.org covered a remarkable 102 
percent of its operating expenses through 
this optional fee. Voluntary donor support of 
operating fees is a type of immediate feed-
back indicating the value the donor places 
on a product or service.
COSt-tO-SeRVe
Cost-to-serve—the cost of providing a 
product or service to a single customer—is 
another metric that we typically track in 
for-profit and nonprofit investees. Cost-to-
serve is an important measure of produc-
tivity—specifically, how efficiently an orga-
nization is delivering a particular product 
or service. In general, we find that despite 
its potential value for driving financially 
sustainable growth, few nonprofits focus 
on reducing cost-to-serve. 
We calculate the cost-to-serve as the quo-
tient of reach and the trailing 12 months of 
operating expenses. Cost-to-serve can vary 
significantly across organizations. For ex-
ample, we estimate that in 2010, Wikimedia’s 
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cost-to-serve each visit to its website was 
$0.02, whereas DonorsChoose.org’s cost-to-
serve was $5.23, or roughly 250 times greater.
Cost-to-serve can offer some insight 
when comparing two businesses with similar 
models in the same sector, but is less useful 
when comparing across sectors. Typically, 
we look at an organization’s cost-to-serve to 
highlight opportunities for efficiency or asset 
productivity improvements. DonorsChoose.
org, for example, is working on reducing its 
cost-to-serve by lowering new user acquisi-
tion costs and increasing the donor retention 
rate. Bridge International Academies—a new 
organization with relatively high startup-re-
lated overhead—has high costs relative to the 
number of students served. As Bridge opens 
more schools and benefits from the result-
ing economies of scale, we expect the cost-
to-serve each student to drop dramatically.
COLLABORAtIVe eVALuAtIOn
A successful relationship between ON and 
each organization is highly collaborative 
and based on trust. Collaboration starts 
with the due diligence process, through 
which ON evaluates the leadership team’s 
ability and commitment to practice exem-
plary governance, operational efficiency, 
transparency, and disciplined financial 
planning. This process builds relationships 
between ON personnel and the investee’s 
management team, establishing the basis 
for a positive, long-term relationship.
The spirit of collaboration and trust car-
ries over to the measurement and evalua-
tion process. Our investment professionals 
work closely with each investee to develop 
milestones jointly and then measure the in-
vestee’s progress against them. For-profit 
companies usually track the desired reach 
and engagement metrics during the normal 
course of business. For some consumer In-
ternet companies, for example, the number 
of unique visitors to a site (reach) and num-
ber of page views per visit (engagement) 
are critical revenue drivers. The organiza-
tion’s performance relative to established 
milestones is an important criterion for ON 
when we consider subsequent investments, 
but specific impact metrics typically are not 
captured in any agreement between ON and 
a for-profit company.
In nonprofits, ON first engages the lead-
ership team in a dialogue about the organi-
zation’s potential social impact, and then 
works with the team to specify appropriate, 
related reach and engagement metrics that 
are codified in the grant agreement. These 
milestones provide a mechanism to both 
hold the organization accountable for achiev-
ing its agreed-upon objectives and identify 
when it might need additional human capital 
support from ON to be successful.
ON’s investment professionals regularly 
review each investee’s performance against 
these metrics. ON holds board seats or board 
observer rights in about 40 percent of our 
portfolio organizations, and metrics are usu-
ally reported by the management team at 
board meetings. If ON does not hold a board 
seat, the grant agreement typically requires 
the investee to provide quarterly reports of 
its progress against the metrics. 
To supplement ongoing performance 
tracking and comprehensively evaluate 
our investees’ progress, ON holds an an-
nual, internal portfolio review. The review 
covers the performance of each portfolio 
organization and the overall performance 
of all organizations by sector.
ON’s human capital contributions keep 
us in frequent contact with our portfolio or-
ganizations’ management teams. The close 
professional relationships with investees 
and the tight integration through these gov-
ernance roles engender a sense of shared 
commitment between ON and each investee, 
building a foundation for effective, real-time 
evaluation and response. The frequent con-
tact creates a continuous flow of information 
between ON and the investee, providing a 
substantial context for important decisions. 
Equally important, ON’s investment profes-
sionals have the added benefit of being able 
to look broadly across the entire market and 
competitive landscape, and can highlight 
specific issues that a more narrowly focused 
management team might miss.
WhAt We’Ve LeARned
ON’s investment model fundamentally 
shapes how we approach measurement and 
evaluation. Developing and applying ON’s 
approach has taught us to:
● Foster partnerships. Trust-based part-
nership is the key to establishing a pro-
ductive approach to measurement and 
evaluation. ON fosters partnerships 
by listening carefully to our investees’ 
needs from the beginning of the due dil-
igence process and investing heavily in 
our human capital function.
● Exercise judgment. Data is rarely a 
substitute for good judgment. Only 
so much can be measured, much that 
matters cannot be measured, and any 
amount of data alone cannot provide 
all the answers. ON invests in talented 
management teams and works with 
them to strike the right balance be-
tween the robustness and complexity 
of a company’s approach to evaluation.
● Be flexible. Markets, competitors, and 
companies can change rapidly. What 
is important to measure today may not 
be meaningful tomorrow, so we cannot 
rely on static measurements in a dy-
namic environment.
● Embrace feedback. We manage what 
we measure. ON takes the time to un-
derstand what the data says about a 
company’s product or service. We then 
help our investees use that information 
to improve their product or service to 
deliver even greater value to custom-
ers, who will ultimately determine 
their success or failure.
At ON we continue to discuss and debate 
many topics related to how we approach 
measurement and evaluation, including 
the appropriate role for independent im-
pact assessments, the optimal resource 
allocation across sectors and companies, 
the best approach to meaningful informa-
tion and data sharing across funders, and 
whether to evaluate ON’s contribution to 
helping shift sectors.
Our view is that an organization’s ap-
proach to measurement and evaluation 
flows directly from its investment model. ON 
regularly re-evaluates whether its investees 
are having a positive impact on the sector 
and whether other investments are neces-
sary to break bottlenecks. ON’s approach to 
measurement and evaluation thus remains a 
work in progress. We continue to iterate and 
innovate, jointly with our colleagues in the 
impact investing sector, with the objective 
of investing in and scaling organizations 
that have the ability to create opportunity 
for millions of people. s
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Shared Outcomes
How the Rockefeller Foundation is approaching evaluation with developing country partners
By JuditH rodin & nancy MacPHerson
Across every sector of society, decision makers are struggling with the complexity and velocity of change in an increasingly in-
terdependent world. The context of decision-
making has evolved, and in many cases has 
been altered in revolutionary ways. In the 
decade ahead our lives will be more intensely 
shaped by transformative forces, includ-
ing economic, environmental, geopolitical, 
societal, and technological seismic shifts.1
As part of its response to this global dy-
namism, the Rockefeller Foundation has 
translated its 1913 mission of promoting the 
well-being of humanity into two overarch-
ing goals: expanding opportunity through 
more equitable growth, and strengthen-
ing resilience to acute crises and chronic 
stresses, whether man-made or ecological. 
Our vision is a world in which globaliza-
tion’s benefits are more widely shared and 
the inevitable challenges that accompany 
a world that is fast changing, diverse, and 
complex are more easily weathered.
The Rockefeller Foundation structures 
its work around time-bound cross-sectoral 
initiatives that seek innovative solutions 
and support enabling environments to 
bring about change. The foundation’s struc-
ture reflects its view that today’s problems 
and solutions are multi-dimensional in 
scope and nature, and that they require 
multi-disciplinary responses at the inter-
section of fields.
Just as the Rockefeller Foundation’s 
approach to philanthropy has evolved, so 
too has its approach to evaluation. With its 
mission to improve the well-being of hu-
mankind, its focus on impact, and much of 
its grantmaking in developing countries, 
the Rockefeller Foundation is commit-
ted to evaluation practices that are rigor-
ous, innovative, inclusive of stakeholders’ 
voices, and appropriate to the contexts in 
which the foundation works. This article 
discusses how the Rockefeller Foundation 
integrates the views of developing-region 
evaluators into its evaluation approaches, 
and highlights five key strategies:
1. Engaging stakeholders to develop 
shared outcomes.
2. Expanding capacity through use of 
non-staff monitoring and evaluation 
specialists to partner with grantees.
3. Sharing knowledge through learning 
forums and communities of practice.
4. Strengthening developing country 
evaluation practice and ownership of 
results.
5. Developing innovative methods and 
approaches to evaluation and learning.
RethInkIng, ReShAPIng,  
And ReFORmIng eVALuAtIOn 
In November 2011, the Rockefeller Founda-
tion brought together leaders from philan-
thropy and development at the Future of 
Philanthropy and Development forum, held 
at its conference center in Bellagio, Italy. 
In one of the keynote papers, Evaluating 
Development Philanthropy in a Changing 
World, Robert Picciotto, former vice presi-
dent at the World Bank and now professor 
at King’s College London, squarely tackled 
the role of evaluation in philanthropy and 
development. “The changing context and 
thinking on development has profound 
implications for development evaluation 
itself, and for the contribution evaluation 
can bring to the empowerment of people; 
and the effectiveness of development in-
terventions by national governments and 
international partners and, increasingly, by 
non-state actors—foundations, philanthro-
pists, and agencies that promote investing 
for impact.”
Picciotto continued, “Pressing human 
needs are not being met by an official aid 
system that is short of resources, catering 
to multiple interests, and hobbled by mas-
sive coordination problems. By contrast, 
private giving for development is growing 
and has proven nimbler and more results-
oriented than official aid. However, the 
philanthropic enterprise will not fulfill its 
potential unless it identifies and taps into 
its distinctive comparative advantage and 
coordinates its interventions with other de-
velopment actors; embeds evaluation in its 
processes to achieve operational relevance, 
effectiveness, and efficiency; and demon-
strates that it is accountable and responsive 
to its diverse stakeholders.”
Developing country evaluation leaders 
have also articulated the need for a new ap-
proach to evaluation and the role it plays in 
JudIth ROdIn is president of the Rockefeller Founda-
tion. Before joining the foundation, she was president of 
the University of Pennsylvania, and preceding that, pro-
vost of Yale University. Rodin is on the board of Citigroup, 
Comcast, and AMR. 
nAnCy mACPheRSOn is managing director, evalu-
ation, at the Rockefeller Foundation. Before joining the 
foundation she spent 25 years in development evaluation 
for international nonprofit organizations in Asia and  
Africa and for the United Nations.
The value of evaluation must ultimately be 
judged by its usefulness in helping to  
improve outcomes for target beneficiaries. 
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improving the wellbeing of humankind—in 
particular, the lives of the poor and vulner-
able in developing countries. At the Janu-
ary 2012 gathering of the Africa Evalua-
tion Association’s biannual conference in 
Accra, Ghana, African evaluation leaders 
and policy makers highlighted five steps 
foundations and development agencies 
must take if they aspire to play a meaning-
ful role in social transformation.
1. Broaden the inclusion of key stake-
holders in evaluation. Only when the 
voices of those whose lives we seek to 
improve are heard, respected, and in-
ternalized, will we be able to effectively 
evaluate what success should look like 
for the people we are most concerned 
about. Foundations and agencies need 
to take practical steps to include key 
stakeholders in the design of, conduct 
of, and learning from evaluation.
2. Regard evaluative knowledge as 
a public good and share it widely. 
Learning with our partners and 
stakeholders about what works and 
what doesn’t work should be seen 
as a global public good not limited 
to boards and program teams, but 
shared widely with grantees, part-
ners, and peers.
3. Address evaluation asymmetries 
between developed and developing 
regions. The majority of human and 
financial resources for evaluation em-
anate from agencies and foundations 
based in the developed world. With 
evaluators from developing countries 
playing a minor role, if any, many of 
them do not get sufficient experience 
to move into leadership roles. Men-
toring, coaching, and training can 
strengthen the role, capacity, and re-
sources of developing-country evalu-
ators so that they can play key roles 
in conducting and using evaluation 
results for social transformation and 
accountability in their own countries. 
4. Broaden the objects of evaluation to 
learn more beyond the individual 
grant or project to a more strategic as-
sessment of portfolios of investments, 
policy change, new financing mecha-
nisms, and sector-wide approaches 
that tell us more about what works and 
what does not in different contexts. 
Framing evaluation to take into ac-
count the drivers of unsustainability 
and causes of the challenge being ad-
dressed provides greater learning than 
narrower evaluations that focus only 
on the funder’s specific intervention.
5. Invest in the development and appli-
cation of innovative new methods and 
tools for evaluation and monitoring that 
reflect multidisciplinary and systems 
approaches to problems and complex-
ity; invest in methods that assess net-
work effectiveness and policy change; 
and use and adapt new technology to 
enable stakeholders to provide close to 
real-time data and feedback.
the ROCkeFeLLeR  
FOundAtIOn’S APPROACh
With its long history of supporting devel-
oping country institutions, the Rockefeller 
Foundation has responded to the call to ac-
tion from developing-region evaluators by 
adopting the following approaches to plan-
ning, monitoring, and evaluating its work.
Shared Outcomes | An important un-
derpinning of the Rockefeller Foundation’s 
initiative-based approach is a fundamental 
recognition that the world’s greatest chal-
lenges can’t be solved alone. These chal-
lenges involve a complex mix of actors that 
are often globally interdependent across sec-
tors and geographies. Networks, alliances, 
and coalitions of diverse stakeholders from 
governments, foundations, civil society, and 
business are increasingly seen by the foun-
dation as a more powerful way to mobilize 
the vast range of resources and actions re-
quired to bring about sustained and trans-
formational change on a significant scale.
Increasingly, the Rockefeller Founda-
tion brings together grantees and partners 
from developed and developing countries 
to establish a common vision of the prob-
lem, outcomes, and indicators for success. 
Grantee agreements now include reference 
to the common vision of results and shared 
outcomes to which the grantee contributes, 
and foundation teams are expected to man-
age portfolios of grants and relationships 
with grantees towards that common vision. 
This shared-outcomes approach forms the 
basis for ongoing monitoring, evaluation, 
and reporting, and for learning dialogues 
with grantees and partners. (See “Shared 
Results Framework” on p. 14.)
Monitoring and Evaluation | Most 
foundations have capacity limitations on 
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the amount of time that can be devoted to 
monitoring and learning with grantees and 
partners, visiting field projects, and working 
collaboratively—activities that we know con-
tribute to greater collaborative learning and 
effective relationships. Recognizing these 
limitations, the foundation awards grants 
to monitoring and evaluation (M&E) groups 
and specialists in developing and developed 
countries who act as monitoring partners, or 
what we call “critical friends,” 2 throughout 
the life of initiatives (typically, a five- to six-
year period). They work with grantees to 
identify key learning questions, help to set 
up monitoring systems, and provide support 
in analyzing monitoring data. The most sig-
nificant feature of the critical friends is that 
they build trust with grantees and partners 
to ask tough evaluative questions, and they 
support grantees in seeking and using feed-
back to make improvements throughout the 
life of the initiative. Periodic evaluations are 
conducted by independent teams to provide 
an objective assessment of progress toward 
outcomes and impact.
For example, the India-based nonprofit 
Participatory Research in Asia, in collabora-
tion with the Ghana-based Institute for Policy 
Alternatives, works alongside Shack/Slum 
Dwellers International (SDI) which directly 
represents millions of urban poor slum dwell-
ers in 33 countries. The aim of this critical 
friend partnership is to strengthen the par-
ticipatory learning, monitoring, and evalua-
tion systems and abilities of the urban poor 
networks to better capture and systematize 
learning and strengthen accountability with 
the goal of empowering the urban poor to 
achieve wider positive impacts. The critical 
friend role underpins a belief that federations 
of the urban poor are capable of changing 
their own situation for the better. As a result 
of this partnership, SDI has strengthened its 
ability to democratize learning, monitoring, 
and evaluation—continuing to place the tools, 
responsibility, and ability for change in the 
hands of its members.
Learning Forums and Communities of 
Practice | Most of the Rockefeller Founda-
tion’s initiative teams convene grantees and 
partners annually to review progress, high-
light lessons and challenges, celebrate suc-
cesses, and identify improvements needed. 
Through these forums grantees learn from 
others in the field, meet new resource people, 
and adjust their strategies going forward. 
Although this practice does not guarantee 
impact, it increases the likelihood of it by 
creating a greater sense of ownership and 
shared outcomes, and it increases leverage 
by connecting grantees with new resource 
people, funders, and mentors. Increasingly, 
M&E grantees produce high-quality knowl-
edge products as a public evaluation good 
to highlight what works, what does not, for 
whom, and under what conditions. Our aim 
is to establish with grantees a body of col-
laborative knowledge, shared lessons, and a 
culture that values evaluation as a resource 
for learning as well as for accountability.
For example, the Rockefeller Foundation 
has aligned with the South East Asia Com-
munity of Practice in Evaluating Climate 
Change Resilience (SEA Change), facili-
tated by the nonprofit organization Pact, to 
work on urban climate change resilience in 
ten Asian cities. This community of prac-
tice brings together evaluators, program 
managers, grantees, and policy makers 
concerned with learning what works in in-
terventions aimed at adapting and building 
resilience to the effects of climate change 
and extreme weather events in Southeast 
Asia. Resources and lessons are shared 
through online learning, onsite convening 
of SEA Change participants, and coaching, 
mentoring, and training provided by mem-
bers of the community of practice through-
Shared Results Framework
This figure illustrates the framework around which Rockefeller Foundation staff, 
grantees, and partners develop a common vision of the results and impact that they 
seek to achieve collectively. The top frame represents the mission and strategy of 
the foundation—promoting the well-being of humanity in two overarching goals: ex-
panding opportunity through more equitable growth, and strengthening resilience. 
The middle frame represents the medium-term outcomes that the foundation seeks 
to achieve during the life of the initiative (these change from initiative to initiative). 
The lower frame represents the work that grantees, partners, and staff do in their indi-
vidual organizations to collectively bring about outcomes and ultimately improve the 
lives of beneficiaries. These shared results frameworks anchor the ongoing dialogue 
with grantees about progress toward achieving this vision and their contribution to 
the shared outcomes. It also serves as a framework for managing portfolios of grants 
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out the countries of Southeast Asia.
Addressing Asymmetries | The Rock-
efeller Foundation is supporting the forma-
tion and strengthening of regional devel-
oping-country networks and the first-ever 
regional institutions to train, coach, and 
mentor evaluators, and to partner with eval-
uators from other regions. Through these 
platforms and networks, the foundation 
aims to help rebalance the asymmetries 
of choice and opportunity for developing-
country evaluators to control the evalua-
tion process in their own localities and to 
improve the quality of evaluation by part-
nering with evaluation leaders globally.
One example of this is the African Evalu-
ation Association (AfrEA), a pan-Africa um-
brella organization comprising more than 25 
national M&E associations in Africa, and a 
resource for individuals in countries where 
national evaluation bodies do not exist. 
AfrEA, which has more than 1,000 evalu-
ators from all regions of Africa, receives 
Rockefeller Foundation funding to enable 
the formalization of its organizational, op-
erational, and management structure, and 
to build communities of practice among 
its membership to tackle the most press-
ing evaluation challenges on the continent.
The Centers for Learning on Evaluation 
and Results, located in Africa and Asia, 
are another example of an effort aimed 
at addressing asymmetries in evaluation 
in developing countries. Together with 
a consortium of funders committed to 
building developing country capacity for 
taking charge of the evaluation agenda in 
their regions, the foundation is supporting 
regional centers 3 in East and West Africa 
and South Asia to strengthen their skills, 
networks, and experience in monitoring 
and evaluation and results-based manage-
ment capacity of public, private, and civil 
society development in the global south.
New Methods and Approaches | Tradi-
tional evaluation methods and approaches 
to learning, accountability, and feedback 
have not kept pace with the advances in 
technology and social media. The majority 
of evaluation practice is still largely paper-
based despite great strides in technology, 
interactive web-based platforms, and mul-
timedia tools that make real-time feedback 
from grantees and beneficiaries possible 
and accessible. The Rockefeller Foundation 
and its partners learned a great deal from 
Ushahidi, an open-source crowdsourcing 
project that allows users to send crisis in-
formation via mobile devices to map reports 
of violence or suffering. Inspired by the po-
tential of these kinds of tools to democratize 
evaluation information, increase transpar-
ency, and lower the barriers for individuals 
to share information and stories, the foun-
dation is supporting a number of innovative 
approaches to evaluation.
One example is GlobalGiving’s Story 
Telling project, an innovative way to gather 
local feedback from people in developing 
countries and to share it with communities, 
implementing organizations, and donors to 
create real-time feedback. With support from 
the Rockefeller Foundation, GlobalGiving 
successfully deployed a network of people 
in Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania that has 
generated more than 20,000 tagged nar-
ratives from thousands of people. Some of 
GlobalGiving’s partners are deriving ac-
tionable intelligence from these stories, and 
GlobalGiving is discovering patterns in the 
stories that inform its own operational and 
strategic decision-making processes.
Another example is BetterEvaluation, an 
online interactive community of evaluation 
practice developed by the Royal Melbourne 
Institute of Technology in partnership with 
the Institutional Learning and Change Ini-
tiative and the Overseas Development In-
stitute, with support from the Rockefeller 
Foundation and Pact. BetterEvaluation 
provides advice, online support, and good 
practice examples to evaluators in develop-
ing and developed countries.
ReShAPIng deVeLOPment 
eVALuAtIOn
Philanthropists and development practi-
tioners have a golden opportunity to join 
together with grantees and partners in de-
veloping countries to reshape evaluation 
to better respond to global change and to 
serve our missions and goals more effec-
tively. To do this, we must be prepared to re-
think and reshape our evaluation practice 
in at least four ways. We must:
1. Embrace a broader set of voices in 
framing our approaches to evaluation.
2. View collaboration and partnerships 
between developed and developing 
areas as mutually beneficial toward a 
common goal of expanding and shar-
ing evaluation knowledge as a public 
good aimed at achieving better devel-
opment outcomes. 
3. Recognize the need to address issues 
of accountability, transparency, eth-
ics, culture, and independence.
4. Address asymmetries in individual 
and institutional capacities for under-
taking, driving, and owning evaluation 
in developing regions by promoting 
opportunities for professional excel-
lence, networks, and sustained global 
partnerships in the discipline of devel-
opment evaluation.
The value of evaluation must ultimately 
be judged by its usefulness in helping to 
improve outcomes for target beneficiaries. 
The quest for impact is currently in the 
spotlight among foundations and devel-
opment agencies as we seek collectively 
to maximize the positive benefits of our 
resources. We are privileged to work in 
an expanding field in which our evalu-
ation findings can change lives for the 
better. Together with our peers, partners, 
and grantees, we can and should rethink, 
reshape, and reform the practice of evalu-
ation to better meet that challenge. s
1 For more discussion of this topic, see Global Risks 
2012, Seventh Edition, World Economic Forum, 2012.
2 The term “critical friend” refers to a partner that 
builds trust and engenders a reflective evaluative 
culture that is able to provide both negative and 
positive feedback to the grantee in a supportive 
way throughout the life of the work.
3 In South Asia The Jameel Poverty Action Lab 
South Asia at the Institute for Financial Manage-
ment and Research, India, with the Center for 
Economic Research in Pakistan; In Africa the Uni-
versity of Witwatersrand with the Kenya Institute 
of Administration and Ghana Institute of Manage-
ment and Public Administration.
We are privileged to work in an expanding 
field in which our evaluation findings can 
change lives for the better.
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Risky Business
How The William and Flora Hewlett Foundation approaches high-risk philanthropic ventures
By Paul Brest
the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation’s Guiding Principles state that the foundation “focuses on the most serious problems fac-
ing society where risk capital, responsibly 
invested, may make a difference over time.” 
The foundation’s grantmaking strategies, 
with goals ranging from mitigating climate 
change to reforming California’s fiscal poli-
cies, reflect the board’s and staff’s consider-
able tolerance for risk. This article outlines 
our framework for investing in strategies 
where the likelihood of success is small and 
often difficult to quantify. Let me begin with 
a little allegory. 
You come across a small, determined 
group of villagers pushing a heavy boulder 
up a steep and craggy glacier. The boulder 
is threatening their homes, and they are 
trying to get it to the top and then roll it 
into an uninhabited valley on the other 
side. The glacier is shrouded in fog, but 
you can discern that there are many peaks, 
valleys, and crevices on the way to the top. 
It isn’t evident that the group is up to the 
task—sometimes it’s one step forward and 
two back—and every once in a while, an 
opposing group tries to push the boulder 
back down the slope. The villagers ask 
you to pitch in. You are persuaded that the 
mission is important, but you don’t know 
their likelihood of success, other than that 
it is small. Before deciding whether to join, 
you would like to know whether your con-
tribution will make a difference, but this is 
difficult to predict.
The metaphor of pushing a boulder up 
a glacier describes a variety of risky phil-
anthropic strategies. Advocacy to change 
public policy is paradigmatic. Other ex-
amples include public interest litigation; 
second-track diplomacy (such as informal 
meetings of Israelis and Palestinians to 
get productive peace talks under way); 
and support for yet-untested innovations 
in service delivery, technology, and medi-
cine (such as an AIDS vaccine). In many 
of these cases the outcomes are subject to 
what economists term “uncertainty” rather 
than “risk,” because the likelihood of suc-
cess is not quantifiable—at least not within 
any satisfactory margins of error.
Moving from allegories to philanthropy, 
I’ll use two hypothetical examples—a risky 
advocacy strategy and, for contrast, a rela-
tively non-risky service delivery program. 
The risky strategy is an environmental or-
ganization’s campaign to persuade a public 
utilities commission to adopt renewable 
portfolio standards, which require a cer-
tain amount of electricity to be generated 
from water, wind, or solar power. The non-
risky example is a program to reduce teen 
pregnancies through a well-evaluated peer 
counseling program. 
Every philanthropic grant has an in-
tended outcome, or goal, such as the use 
of fewer hydrocarbons in generating elec-
tricity or reducing teen pregnancies. Phi-
lanthropists are interested in outcomes 
from three points of view: ex-ante—how 
likely the strategy is to have its intended 
outcome; in progress—whether the strat-
egy is on course toward that outcome; 
and ex-post—whether the strategy actu-
ally achieved its intended outcome. As I 
will discuss later, philanthropists are ulti-
mately concerned with impact rather than 
outcomes—with whether the activities they 
support actually cause or contribute to the 
outcomes. But it is useful to begin with out-
comes, which are necessary, though not 
sufficient, for achieving impact.
ex-Ante
The Theory of Change | Before investing in 
a particular venture, a philanthropist needs 
to understand how and why it is likely to 
achieve its intended outcome. Making that 
assessment requires a theory of change—
an empirically based causal theory that 
links activities to outcomes. It is causal 
because it holds that if you do a particular 
activity, then a specific outcome is likely 
to happen—if you press on the gas pedal, 
the car will move. It is empirical because 
it purports to describe the way the world 
actually works. The causal theory may be 
based on an understanding of the under-
lying mechanism (the gas pedal is con-
nected to the carburetor …) or observation 
(every time I’ve seen someone press on the 
gas pedal, the car has moved). Although a 
theory of change is based on the analysis 
of the causal links of past interventions, it 
provides a basis for predicting the effects 
of future interventions as well. 
A teen pregnancy prevention program 
might be based on any number of different 
theories of change—for example, that one 
can reduce pregnancies by counseling ab-
stinence, or by educating teens about how 
to use contraceptives and making them 
available. The theory of change might posit 
that the best counselor is a peer, a religious 
leader, or someone with medical expertise 
in contraception.
What makes assessing the likelihood 
of succeeding in direct service interven-
tions relatively easy is that their validity 
can be assessed by well-established meth-
ods of evaluation. The gold standard for 
evaluation is randomized controlled trials 
(RCTs), in which the target group of teenag-
ers is randomly assigned either to a group 
receiving the counseling (the treatment 
group) or to a group that does not receive 
the intervention (the control group), and 
PAuL BReSt is president of The William and Flora 
Hewlett Foundation. Before joining the foundation in 
2000, he was a professor at Stanford Law School, serving 
as dean from 1987 to 1999. 
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the outcomes (pregnancy rates) are com-
pared.1 Evaluators are interested in two fun-
damental questions: the magnitude of the 
effect of the intervention (what percentage 
of participants avoid pregnancy as a result 
of the program?) and whether the difference 
between the treatment and control group 
is statistically significant. 
It turns out that although abstinence-
only education has no effect, some pro-
grams that include information on con-
traception can make a difference.2 For our 
hypothetical example, let’s assume that in 
a high-quality study of a program involving 
thousands of girls, only 4 percent of those in 
the treatment group become pregnant, com-
pared to 7 percent of non-participants—a 43 
percent improvement, which is an extraor-
dinarily good outcome for any social inter-
vention. Because the likelihood of achiev-
ing the benefit is not only determinate but 
high, the teen pregnancy program is not 
risky from the philanthropist’s perspective. 
The effort to advocate for renewable port-
folio standards also is supported by a theory 
of change, in this case from the domain of 
political science. In its most general sense, 
the theory links the organization’s advocacy 
activities to the intended outcome of per-
suading the decision makers to adopt the 
regulation. More specifically, the theory of 
change specifies the conditions under which 
advocacy will be effective—and the paths to 
effectiveness—based on what motivates the 
decision makers and how to manipulate the 
(often indirect) levers to affect their behavior.
But this theory of change is not test-
able through methods such as RCTs, which 
rely on the comparison of large samples of 
very similar subjects. The political theory 
of change is a set of generalizations based 
on the observation of a number of unique 
events—advocacy concerning different 
issues in different contexts. Moreover, 
the inputs and outputs of such events are 
often ambiguous. As Steven Teles and 
Mark Schmitt write in “The Elusive Craft 
of Evaluating Advocacy” (summer 2011 is-
sue of Stanford Social Innovation Review), 
“Sometimes political outputs are reason-
ably proximate and traceable to inputs, but 
sometimes results are quite indirectly re-
lated and take decades to come to fruition.”
Even when one can have some sense of 
the likelihood of success of an advocacy 
strategy, the margins of error are typically 
so large as to put the enterprise in the do-
main of uncertainty rather than quantifi-
able risk. (Predicting the outcome of an 
advocacy strategy is somewhat analogous 
to predicting the counseling program’s 
success in preventing one particular par-
ticipant’s pregnancy.)
The Logic Model | The theory of change 
for an intervention provides the basis for its 
logic model, which describes (among other 
things) the activities that an organization 
must undertake to achieve the desired out-
come. For example, the logic model for the 
pregnancy prevention program involves 
the logistics of counseling. It includes activ-
ities such as recruiting the target group of 
teenagers, recruiting and training counsel-
ors, setting up counseling sessions, and en-
suring that the counselors provide the req-
uisite information and support. Although 
there is plenty of room for variation—for 
example, in the substance and dynamics of 
the counseling sessions—the logic model is 
essentially a cookbook recipe. 
By contrast, an advocacy strategy sel-
dom has a detailed recipe—only a number 
of dos and don’ts, whens and hows, from the 
accumulated knowledge of master chefs.3 
For example, the strategy for achieving re-
newable portfolio standards might involve 
identifying the views and motivations of the 
public utility commissioners and approach-
ing each one individually or persuading a 
constituent to approach them.
As Teles and Schmitt write: “[Advocacy 
is] inherently political, and it’s the nature of 
politics that events evolve rapidly and in a 
nonlinear fashion, so an effort that doesn’t 
seem to be working might suddenly bear 
fruit, or one that seemed to be on track can 
suddenly lose momentum. … [T]actics that 
may have worked in one instance are not 
necessarily more likely to succeed in an-
other. What matters is whether advocates 
can choose the tactic appropriate to a par-
ticular conflict and adapt to the shifting 
moves of the opposition. ... [S]uccessful 
advocates know that such plans are at best 
loose guides, and the path to change may 
branch off in any number of directions. … 
Successful advocacy efforts are character-
ized not by their ability to proceed along a 
predefined track, but by their capacity to 
adapt to changing circumstances.”
Predicting a Program’s Value | From 
the strength of the evidence underlying 
the theory of change and the details of the 
logic model, one can predict (with more 
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or less confidence) the value of a philan-
thropic investment in a particular program 
or strategy.
There are two related ways of assessing 
the value of the teen pregnancy prevention 
program, both of which are captured in this 
simple equation:4
 Value =  Benefit
   Cost
In our example, the benefit is the reduc-
tion of teen pregnancies.
Cost-effectiveness analysis compares 
the impact of different programs seeking 
to achieve the same result. For example, 
if our program costs $100 per participant, 
while a different program serving the same 
population achieves the identical results 
for $75, our program is less cost effective.
Cost-benefit analysis takes cost-effective-
ness analysis one (ambitious, if not heroic) 
step further by monetizing the value of an 
averted teen pregnancy. In principle, this al-
lows a donor to compare the effectiveness of 
the teen pregnancy prevention program with, 
say, a program for preventing drug abuse.5
Even when one cannot undertake a 
formal cost-benefit analysis, a donor may 
have an intuitive sense of when a program 
is having enough impact to justify his or 
her charitable support: $3,000 to prevent 
one pregnancy6 may seem like a bargain, 
whereas $30,000 may seem excessive.
The framework for assessing risky strat-
egies adds the element of risk to the cost-
benefit equation in the form of likelihood of 
success. The value, or expected return, of 
the strategy takes into account the magni-
tude of the benefit if the strategy succeeds, 
the likelihood of success, and the cost of 
pursuing the strategy.
Expected =   Benefit × Likelihood of success return Cost
The equation captures the fact that a 
risky philanthropic venture with a small 
likelihood of success is justified by very 
high benefits if it does succeed. That’s the 
explanation for much policy advocacy, 
second-track diplomacy, early stage R&D, 
and, of course, joining the group pushing 
the boulder up the glacier. But, it is devil-
ishly difficult to quantify the likelihood of 
success in these cases. 
At the Hewlett Foundation, we have 
been working on approaches to reducing 
the margins of error by keeping track of fac-
tors that commonly contribute to success. 
For advocacy, this includes the existence of 
technically and financially viable solutions, 
windows of political opportunity, and the 
presence of inside and outside champions 
for the outcome. The expertise of experi-
enced advocates plays a role as well. But 
even experts lack reliable intuitions about 
the probability of unlikely outcomes, exhib-
iting more confidence than accuracy.7 Thus, 
thoughtful philanthropists gather as much 
information as possible about the paths to 
a successful outcome, make their best es-
timate, place their bets, and adjust as new 
information becomes available.
In PROgReSS
Assessing Progress | The activities pre-
scribed by a logic model provide the frame-
work for assessing progress. Because the 
pregnancy prevention program’s activities 
have a causal relationship to its intended 
outcome, the organization and its funders 
can assess progress in terms of, say, the 
number of counselors and teenage partici-
pants recruited, the number of counseling 
sessions held, the participants’ views of 
the value of the sessions, and (perhaps) its 
effect on their behavior. A small program 
may not be able to obtain reliable informa-
tion about the pregnancy rates of its teen 
participants, but basing the program on 
reliable documented studies gives rise to 
reasonable confidence that the activities 
will deliver the hoped-for results.
The logic model for a risky advocacy 
strategy provides a structurally analogous 
framework, but is much more dynamic and 
far less certain of success. If an essential 
aspect of the strategy is to communicate 
with uncommitted members of the public 
utilities commission, or with individuals or 
groups who could influence them, then it is 
possible to determine whether the commu-
nications were made, received, and acted 
on. But throughout the process, advocates 
must make tactical decisions in the absence 
of reliable information.  
Even non-risky strategies can be de-
railed by exogenous events—consider the 
many social programs in New Orleans that 
faltered in the wake of Hurricane Katrina. 
But risky strategies tend to be even more 
vulnerable: unforeseen events may relegate 
an issue that was ripe for legislative action 
to the back burner, or key supporters of a 
policy measure may have their attention 
drawn to other matters or even defect.
The logic model for many social inter-
ventions is essentially linear: additional 
counselors counseling additional partici-
pants lead to fewer teen pregnancies. In 
contrast, most risky philanthropic ventures 
are nonlinear. There may be long periods 
during which no progress is apparent, and 
then the desired outcome occurs—or not. 
And even if the desired outcome occurs, 
other forces may try to thwart its effective 
implementation or try to reverse it.
Paralleling these observations, a phil-
anthropic donation to a well-tested ser-
vice-delivery program is almost assured of 
having some impact. Although some risky 
ventures may have partial successes, others 
have all-or-nothing outcomes. For example, 
after years of advocacy by climate organi-
zations, Congress failed to adopt a cap on 
carbon dioxide emissions.
Tactical retreats and pulling the 
plug | Changing circumstances during the 
implementation of a risky strategy some-
times call not merely for adjustments but 
for a tactical retreat until the environment 
improves. For example, after a multi-year 
initiative to reform public school gov-
ernance and finance in California, the 
Hewlett Foundation concluded that it could 
not make significant gains until the state 
addressed more fundamental governance 
problems. Rather than abandon the effort 
entirely, the foundation has continued to 
support a group of organizations to engage 
in research, conduct policy analysis and 
advocacy, and be prepared to act when 
promising opportunities arise.
Before investing in a particular venture, a  
philanthropist needs to understand how and 
why it is likely to achieve its intended outcome.
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At some point, even a funder with a 
high tolerance for failure may decide that 
the opportunity costs of continuing a risky 
strategy outweigh its potential benefits. 
For example, most US climate advocates 
have shifted attention from Congress to 
the states. But it’s hard to know when to 
give up. It is said that it took Thomas Edi-
son 1,001 tries to come up with a workable 
light bulb, and that he commented: “I have 
not failed 1,000 times. I have successfully 
discovered 1,000 ways to not make a light 
bulb.” But what if Edison had given up be-
fore the 1,001st effort?
Just as the expected return equation pro-
vides a framework for deciding whether to 
undertake a risky venture in the first place, 
it provides guidance in deciding whether to 
abandon an ongoing venture. Besides the dif-
ficulty of doing the numbers, however, the 
decision to pull the plug is complicated by 
the competing psychological phenomena of 
impatience on the one hand, and the fallacy 
of sunk costs on the other. 
ex-POSt
Learning from Success and Failure | 
Evaluating the actual impact of a philan-
thropic strategy necessarily occurs after 
the strategy has been implemented. The 
evaluation provides feedback for improv-
ing the design and implementation of the 
strategy and deciding whether to continue 
investing in it. 
For these purposes, one must look be-
yond outcomes to ask whether the strategy 
actually had impact. Although an orga-
nization and its funders may rightly take 
pleasure in seeing their intended outcome 
occur, the value of their work depends on 
whether the outcome would or would not 
otherwise have occurred. The point is 
nicely captured by the Sam Gross cartoon 
published in the Aug. 1, 1991, issue of The 
New Yorker, which shows a pack of wolves 
howling at the moon, with one saying: “My 
question is: Are we making an impact?”
The counseling program achieved its 
intended outcome to the extent that partici-
pants did not become pregnant, but lacked 
impact if they wouldn’t have become preg-
nant in any event. The RCT that underlay 
the program’s theory of change predicted 
its impact by establishing the baseline of 
pregnancy without the intervention and 
showing that the intervention had a statis-
tically significant effect.
Assessing the environment organiza-
tion’s impact in advocating for renewable 
portfolio standards is a quite different mat-
ter. Even if the desired outcome occurred, 
exogenous factors, such as political do-
nations by a wind turbine manufacturer, 
may have contributed to the public utility 
commission’s adoption of the standards. Of 
course, many exogenous factors contribute 
to a teenager’s getting pregnant or not, but 
evaluation of the program through RCTs 
or similar means is designed to assess the 
program’s contribution to the outcome by 
holding exogenous factors constant. The 
theory of change underlying the advocacy 
strategy is neither as specific nor as specifi-
cally evaluable.
From the evaluation of the teen preg-
nancy prevention program, one can say that 
the program contributed a certain amount 
to reducing teen pregnancies. By the same 
token, one can say that the outcome was 
attributable to the program. To the extent 
a donor supported the program, he or she 
can appropriately claim attribution as well.
Occasionally, but very rarely, the causal 
link between an advocacy strategy and its 
intended outcome is so clear that one can 
attribute the outcome to a particular orga-
nization. Suppose, in our example, that the 
public utilities commissioners were predis-
posed against renewable portfolio stan-
dards, that no other groups advocated for 
them, and that our organization persuaded 
the commissioners one by one.
But typically there are so many exog-
enous factors and so many other advo-
cates that, as Teles and Schmitt say, “If it 
is hard to know whether advocacy played 
any part in a policy outcome, it is harder 
still to know whether any particular orga-
nization or strategy made the difference.” 
In these cases, which are typical of risky 
philanthropic ventures, some commenta-
tors have used “contribution” in a different 
sense, meaning not that the organization’s 
effort contributed a certain percentage 
to the outcome, but rather that its efforts 
increased the likelihood of achieving the 
outcome (though seldom quantifiably). It’s 
like joining the group pushing the boulder 
up the glacier, but not knowing with much 
confidence whether the group would have 
succeeded without you.
Thus the success (or failure) of an advo-
cacy strategy provides little information 
about the soundness of its underlying theory 
of change. Second-track diplomacy has the 
same characteristics, and then some, be-
cause diplomatic negotiations are even more 
opaque than domestic politics. Although not 
a paradox, it is an irony of most risky grant-
making that although one can make thought-
ful bets ex-ante, one may not fully know how 
they eventuated ex-post. Kierkegaard wrote 
that “Life can only be understood backwards; 
but it must be lived forward.” Alas, much 
risky philanthropy cannot be understood 
even in retrospect. 
Donors who made risky grants with high 
potential benefits ex-ante may regret the de-
cision if they do not succeed. Indeed, hind-
sight bias may lead a foundation’s board or 
management to think that its staff should 
have anticipated that a risky strategy would 
fail. Without claiming that the Hewlett 
Foundation’s staff and board are entirely im-
mune to this pervasive psychological bias, 
we try to learn from our failures as well as 
celebrate successes, reminding ourselves 
that taking appropriate risks may be phi-
lanthropy’s highest calling. s
Copyright © Paul Brest 2012. This work is licensed under 
the Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 Unported License. 
To view a copy of this license, visit http://creativecom-
mons.org/licenses/by/3.0/ . 
I am grateful for improvements suggested by Ivan Bark-
horn, Peter Belden, Iris Brest, Jeremy Brest, Jacob Har-
old, C.R. Hibbs, Steven Teles, and Fay Twersky.
1 There are other methods for evaluating such inter-
ventions—for example, matching participants in 
the program with a group of teens with similar de-
mographic characteristics—that are less expensive 
but also usually less robust. And even strong find-
ings in an RCT do not entail that an intervention 
will be equally effective with a different demo-
graphic group or under different circumstances.
2 Compare Christopher Trenholm, Barbara Devaney, 
Ken Fortson, et al., Impacts of Four Title V, Section 
510 Abstinence Education Programs, Princeton, 
N.J.: Mathematica Policy Research Inc., April 
2007, with Douglas Kirby et al. “Sex and HIV  
Programs: Their Impact on Sexual Behaviors of 
Young People Throughout the World,” Journal of 
Adolescent Health 40 (2007): 206-217.
3 A classic work on this subject is John Kingdon’s 
Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies.
4 For a good discussion of such approaches, see 
Measuring and/or Estimating Social Value  




5 The Robin Hood Foundation has done ambitious 
work in this respect.
6 Actually the average cost is $3,333, based on the 
cost of $100 per participant and its success in 
avoiding 3 pregnancies for every 100 participants. 
7 See Philip Tetlock, Expert Political Judgment: How 
Good Is It? How Can We Know? 2006.
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Assessing One’s  
Own Performance
What the Irvine Foundation has learned over the past six years about performance assessment
By JaMes e. canales & kevin rafter
Private foundations enjoy a unique degree of freedom to pursue their missions without the constraints that face many other nonprofit 
organizations. Such freedom can also be a 
challenge insofar as it comes without the 
external forces that can drive organiza-
tions to achieve results. As Thomas Tierney 
and Joel Fleishman note in their book Give 
Smart: Philanthropy that Gets Results: “in 
philanthropy excellence is self-imposed.” 
That reality contributed to our decision 
to create a new framework—called Foun-
dation Performance Assessment—to help 
us assess The James Irvine Foundation’s 
performance.
In this article we describe the Irvine 
Foundation’s approach to performance as-
sessment and discuss some of the lessons 
we have learned over the past six years. We 
write from the dual vantage point of having 
been involved in creating and evolving the 
foundation’s approach to performance as-
sessment as well as producing the annual 
report that describes our performance (re-
port preparation is integrated into our as-
sessment process). We define Foundation 
Performance Assessment as an effort to 
assess the organization’s performance by 
examining the various levers by which the 
institution can achieve its mission.
The Irvine Foundation was created in 
1937 to benefit the people of California. In 
the 75 years since its inception, the foun-
dation has awarded more than $1 billion 
in grants to thousands of organizations 
serving Californians. The majority of our 
grantmaking falls into three program areas: 
youth, arts, and California democracy. The 
youth program helps high school students 
build a strong foundation for success in 
both college and career. The arts program 
promotes engagement in the arts for all 
Californians. And our California democ-
racy program advances effective public 
policy decision-making that is reflective of 
and responsive to all Californians. All three 
areas are guided by our mission of expand-
ing opportunity for the people of California.
the PeRFORmAnCe ASSeSSment 
FRAmeWORk
A major strategic planning process in 2003 
led the Irvine Foundation to streamline its 
program focus and create a new perfor-
mance assessment approach. As the result 
of a comprehensive review and planning pro-
cess, we updated our mission statement and 
trimmed six diverse program areas to three.
Once we had identified where we would 
focus and what we sought to achieve, we 
turned our attention to how to measure 
and assess our progress toward achiev-
ing our goals. We assembled an ad hoc 
committee of board members and staff to 
help shape this work, and we spent several 
months studying the best practices of other 
foundations that were pioneering founda-
tion performance assessment. Although a 
few foundations—most notably the Robert 
Wood Johnson Foundation—stood out, we 
concluded that few foundations were taking 
a comprehensive approach to performance 
assessment, and there was therefore an op-
portunity for the Irvine Foundation to con-
tribute to the development of new ideas and 
approaches in this emerging area.
With the few existing models in mind 
and the knowledge that foundation per-
formance assessment was still nascent, 
we created the Performance Assessment 
Framework. With the Irvine Foundation 
board of directors as the primary audience, 
the framework addresses six areas—the first 
three focusing on our programmatic work, 
and the remaining three providing a more 
institution-wide view.
We evaluate our performance in these 
six areas by asking the following six ques-
tions. The results of this inquiry provide 
the basis for our yearly report to the board. 
1. What is the context in our program 
fields? This section of the performance as-
sessment outlines information that helps 
our board understand how the Irvine Foun-
dation’s work fits in a broader context. For 
JAmeS e. CAnALeS has been the president and CEO 
of The James Irvine Foundation since 2003 and held nu-
merous positions at Irvine since 1993. He is also a past 
board chair of Grantmakers for Effective Organizations. 
keVIn RAFteR is the manager of research and evalu-
ation at The James Irvine Foundation and has been at 
Irvine since 2007. He received a PhD from the City Uni-
versity of New York, where he conducted research on the 
nonprofit and philanthropic sector. 
Our work in evaluation and performance  
assessment helps focus program staff on the 
goals and outcomes for their grantmaking.
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example, we include external indicators 
and new research findings that are relevant 
to our program goals. We also report on 
grantmaking by peer foundations in simi-
lar areas. Board members have indicated 
that this context is valuable to their deeper 
understanding of the challenges and op-
portunities we face in each program area.
2. What progress are we making toward 
our program goals? This section reports 
on evaluation findings and program prog-
ress indicators that track the impact of our 
grantmaking. The progress indicators are 
developed by each program team and cover 
a range of information, both quantitative and 
qualitative. The indicators are organized by 
the goals and priorities in each of our pro-
grams. In many respects, this section covers 
much of what is traditionally considered to 
be “evaluation” of a foundation’s work.
3. How do lessons from our program 
work improve our approach? This section 
discusses how we have used our grant 
monitoring, evaluations, and other engage-
ments in the field to inform and refine our 
strategies and implementation. Because the 
Irvine Foundation’s philosophy of evalua-
tion is guided by continuous improvement 
and refinement, much of our work with the 
board during the year focuses on this set 
of questions. In this section of the annual 
performance report we summarize our 
activities and reinforce our commitment 
to ongoing improvement.
4. How is the foundation exercising lead-
ership in the field? This section, which shifts 
the focus from specific programs to the 
broader organization, assesses the ways we 
can use our leadership platform and voice 
to extend our impact and advance the foun-
dation’s mission. We do not presume that 
leadership is conferred upon us by virtue of 
our resources, but we are also mindful that 
foundations can play important leadership 
roles, especially when done with humility 
and through authentic partnership. Here 
we assess leadership activities undertaken 
by the foundation as well as ways we help 
to frame discussion, often via publications. 
We are beginning to integrate social media 
measures into this work.
5. How do key stakeholders perceive us, 
and how do their perceptions inform our 
work? This section reports feedback we 
have solicited about how important con-
stituents view the foundation—typically 
collected by third-party surveys, confi-
dential interviews, or other organized fora. 
We typically include results from Grantee 
Perception Reports administered by the 
Center for Effective Philanthropy, web-
site user surveys, and other constituent 
feedback activities. We have found that 
the self-imposed requirement for external 
feedback to include in our annual report 
encourages us to identify more feedback 
opportunities than we might otherwise—a 
good development.
6. How are we performing on measures 
of financial health and organizational ef-
fectiveness? In this section we track a num-
ber of indicators related to the foundation’s 
investment performance, operating ratios 
and costs, board and staff diversity, and 
institutional developments. In contrast to 
other parts of the report, for this section 
we are able to draw on ready sources of fi-
nancial benchmarks for comparable insti-
tutions in the field and for the foundation’s 
past performance.
It is important to note that when answer-
ing these six questions, we operate with the 
assumption that the measurement needs to 
fit the subject matter. As much as possible, 
we rely on quantitative data for maximum 
precision and clarity. For some topics in our 
framework, such as exercising leadership or 
gathering constituent feedback, a quantita-
tive approach may not be as useful, so we try 
to balance the quantitative and qualitative. 
eVOLutIOn, ReFInement,  
And ImPROVement
Our Performance Assessment Framework 
has evolved using feedback from the board 
and our experience creating and using the 
annual performance reports. The most 
important evolution has been to change 
the sequence and emphasis of topics. The 
framework initially led with a review of new 
grantmaking during the reporting year, but 
we have reorganized the report to focus at-
tention on the progress and results of our 
previously awarded grants. We include a 
grantmaking summary as an appendix to 
the annual performance report, but we rely 
on quarterly dashboards to keep the board 
members up to date on recent approvals.
An important goal in creating the Per-
formance Assessment Framework was to 
create a view of the foundation’s work as a 
whole rather than as a series of parts. It was 
the quest for a holistic view that motivated 
us to organize the report by topics—the six 
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questions—rather than by programs. That 
said, as a multipurpose foundation, we have 
three very distinct bodies of work in our 
three core programs, so although we take 
stock of the foundation as a whole, we do not 
attempt to aggregate measures into a single 
index for the foundation. Rather, we weigh 
progress and challenges to learn from each.
AudIenCeS FOR ASSeSSment
Over time we have broadened our thinking 
about the audiences for our performance as-
sessment work. The main audience for our 
annual performance report is the founda-
tion’s board of directors. The report is one 
of the primary deliverables for our annual 
retreat at which we conduct in-depth con-
versations with the board about our work. 
As part of the evolution of our framework 
and with our board’s feedback, we came to 
define three additional audiences for our 
performance assessment work.
Our staff, especially the program staff, 
are a second important audience that can 
derive benefit from both the assessment 
process and results. The annual perfor-
mance report represents a regular check-
in on our ongoing process of strategy de-
velopment and refinement. Our work in 
evaluation and performance assessment 
helps focus program staff on the goals and 
outcomes for their grantmaking. We have 
found that challenges in performance as-
sessment often help uncover areas where 
our strategy needs refinement and elabo-
ration. The process of reviewing progress 
indicators and other material to develop the 
annual performance report helps us reflect 
on how the progress we’ve made should in-
form the work ahead.
In addition to the two internal audiences, 
we believe that the analysis in our annual 
performance report can provide grantees 
and other funders—our third target audi-
ence—with a better understanding of how 
we define success in our work. Over time, 
we believe this understanding can facilitate 
collaboration toward shared goals. We re-
conceived the foundation’s public annual 
report (which is different from the annual 
report we provide to the board) to integrate 
performance assessment content so that 
our grantee partners have easier access to 
the information.
The general public is a fourth, although 
lower priority, audience. By including more 
performance assessment in our public an-
nual report and making it generally avail-
able, we seek to contribute to a broader un-
derstanding of philanthropy’s role in society 
beyond the grantmaking transaction.
LeSSOnS LeARned
Literature on measurement and evalua-
tion reminds us that consciously building 
in opportunities for learning will help us 
use our results in actionable ways. At the 
Irvine Foundation, that wisdom has helped 
to guide our approach to performance as-
sessment across the foundation. From the 
beginning, we knew we were experiment-
ing; building on the work of pioneers in 
foundation-wide assessment, such as the 
Robert Wood Johnson Foundation. We also 
knew we did not have the answers, and now, 
after six years of creating and evolving our 
framework, we know that we still have more 
to learn. At the same time, we are equally 
persuaded that our commitment to foun-
dation-wide performance assessment has 
made us a better foundation—one in which 
a culture of reflection, learning, and refine-
ment has become even more pronounced, 
and in which we actively find ways to use 
what we learn from performance assess-
ments to improve our strategic thinking 
and, by extension, to deepen our impact.
Recognizing that our assessment frame-
work remains a work in progress, we offer 
the following three lessons in the hope 
that they may inform others who are in-
terested in foundation-wide performance 
assessment. 
Lesson 1: The traditional structure of 
philanthropic activity can conflict with a 
commitment to performance assessment, 
so it is important to address related barri-
ers and incentives. 
Incentives within foundations are typi-
cally organized around the core activity of 
awarding grants. The IRS mandate to spend 
grant dollars annually helps to drive the 
requisite work of grantmaking—proposal 
review, site visits, docket preparation—all 
leading up to board decisions about grant 
awards at designated intervals throughout 
the year. When one cycle concludes, another 
begins—or more often, cycles overlap and 
docket deadlines are constantly looming for 
foundation staff. We have concluded that 
this structure tends to discourage careful 
reflection, thoughtful analysis, and distilla-
tion of lessons learned. Often, these activi-
ties are considered luxuries at their best and 
distractions at their worst.
For a foundation to embrace fully a com-
mitment to institution-wide performance 
assessment, careful consideration must be 
given to addressing this structural barrier, 
which tends to focus us primarily on the 
next deadline at the expense of what we are 
learning and how we are using that learn-
ing. We have discovered a related temporal 
challenge. Because of regulations related to 
payout, grant budgets are often organized 
around an annual calendar. Our program 
goals and aspirations rarely follow annual 
timelines, nor should they, if they are suf-
ficiently ambitious in scope. So how do we 
reconcile these different timelines?
At the Irvine Foundation, the discipline 
of producing an annual performance report 
to our board (and then sharing it publicly) 
has oriented us toward a sharper focus on 
reporting progress, not necessarily final 
results. To do so, we have had to orient 
ourselves toward identifying shorter- and 
medium-term indicators and measures of 
progress that we can track and report on in 
annual increments.
The need to clarify these indicators and 
measures of progress has been a valuable 
contribution to our strategy development 
and refinement as well, because it has forced 
us to articulate more clearly both the logic 
and sequence of outcomes we seek. We be-
lieve that any foundation committed to as-
sessing its performance must determine how 
best to keep the grantmaking work moving 
forward while creating the space for con-
sideration of broader progress assessment.
Lesson 2: Foundation performance as-
A commitment to foundation performance 
assessment can force us both to consider con-
text and to build in opportunities for learning. 
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sessment both requires and fosters a cul-
ture of reflection and learning that can 
lead to ongoing refinement and program 
improvement. 
Much of today’s business literature speaks 
to the importance of building adaptive orga-
nizations that stay closely attuned to their 
external environments and retool strategies 
in ways that align with that ever-shifting con-
text. Although foundations do not necessarily 
think in terms of  “competitive advantage” or 
worry about going out of business, founda-
tions do have an obligation to remain atten-
tive to the context of their work.
Similarly, we need to find ways to create 
feedback loops that permit us to use what 
we learn to improve our strategies. A prom-
ising development over the past decade has 
been a more intentional focus on evaluation 
for learning and improvement rather than 
simply for auditing purposes or declaring 
success or failure. Although we certainly 
need to use evaluation to guide our under-
standing of whether we are succeeding or 
failing, we stand to benefit significantly if 
we can use what we learn to improve our 
strategies and their execution.
In this respect, performance assessment 
is inextricably linked to program strategy, 
and it has been our experience that a focus 
on assessment has improved the rigor and 
logic of our program strategy. As previ-
ously noted, a key contribution of this pro-
cess has been defining progress indicators 
that allow us to determine whether we are 
making the kind of progress we seek in the 
short term, and if not, to understand what 
that might imply about our strategies. We 
have discovered that even the process of 
identifying these indicators can help us 
to surface possible instances of underde-
veloped strategic thinking or unrealistic 
expected outcomes.
A commitment to foundation perfor-
mance assessment can force us both to con-
sider context and to build in opportunities 
for learning. From the beginning, our Perfor-
mance Assessment Framework contained a 
section on what we call “program context.” 
It was designed to encourage us to collect 
data about the contextual issues related to 
our programs. We also annually collect data 
on other philanthropic investments in the 
particular areas we fund. Examining both 
of these contextual data sets helps us under-
stand better how we view the foundation’s 
contribution and track other philanthropy 
and the broader trends in our focus areas. 
Interestingly, this contextual data has been 
one of the areas that our board has found the 
most interesting. It has helped them to posi-
tion our work in a broader context and has 
encouraged us to find other ways to expose 
the board to the environment and context 
for the foundation’s efforts.
Understanding the context and re-
flecting upon our learning, however, can 
be useful only if it can then be translated 
into action. This is where we have tried to 
demonstrate our commitment to adapt-
ability without falling prey to a tendency 
by foundations to embrace the issue of the 
day. For example, in our California democ-
racy program we have remained focused 
on the goal of advancing more representa-
tive public policy decision making. As we 
have approached this priority from differ-
ent angles, such as voter mobilization and 
civic engagement, the program team has 
analyzed the products of its grantmaking 
and adjusted its strategy as appropriate. 
Lesson 3: Successful foundation perfor-
mance assessment requires both buy-in and 
engagement from stakeholders at all levels.
The old adage that “leadership starts 
at the top” holds true for foundation per-
formance assessment. Without demon-
strated commitment and visible leadership 
from the board, the CEO, and other senior 
officers, foundation performance assess-
ment simply cannot succeed. We put it 
this starkly because the effort required for 
foundation performance assessment man-
dates full institutional commitment and 
cannot be the province of just the evalua-
tion director.
Obtaining the buy-in of the board from 
the very beginning was essential. We cre-
ated a board task force to help us design 
our approach to foundation performance 
assessment, and from the outset we viewed 
the board as the lead initial stakeholder. 
We did so because we believed it would 
advance board members’ understanding of 
the foundation’s progress and impact—an 
important outcome by itself—but we also 
knew it would signal both internally and 
externally just how important this work 
was to the foundation.
For the process to take hold, it also re-
quires broad-based buy-in from the staff. 
We were perhaps well-served by the fact 
that our foray into foundation performance 
assessment coincided with the adoption of 
a new strategic plan and the staff change 
that often accompanies a shift in new direc-
tions. The foundation’s staff embraced this 
approach from the outset, and it became 
part of the way we did business. Nonethe-
less, we recognize the need to ensure that 
staff view performance assessment not as 
an additional burden, but rather as a tool to 
inform better decisions. 
COnCLuSIOn
This article explains how we have struc-
tured and evolved our foundation’s perfor-
mance assessment. We are eager to share 
our approach, not just because we are per-
suaded that adopting an institutional view 
of performance assessment can improve 
a foundation’s work, but also because we 
want to create a broader community of 
foundations committed to learning from 
each other about this important dimension 
of our work. Fortunately, we have moved 
beyond the question of whether measure-
ment and evaluation are useful, but there 
remains much to be explored about how 
the tools of measurement and evaluation 
can be applied across a foundation’s work. 
That’s where we have been experimenting 
for the past six years and where we know 
we still have a great deal to learn.
Among the questions that we have yet 
to explore is how an approach to founda-
tion performance assessment can work in 
organizations of different sizes and scopes. 
Although the Irvine Foundation is a rela-
tively large foundation, we are also regional 
in scope and focus on only a few program 
areas. How this approach can be applied in 
a foundation with a broader mandate and 
more diverse portfolio of grantmaking re-
mains an open question.
We hope this contribution to the body 
of knowledge on performance assessment 
can support robust exploration of questions 
such as these. In the end, our institutions ex-
ist to provide a public benefit, and we must 
therefore embrace opportunities that might 
enable us to deliver on that promise more ef-
fectively. We believe that a commitment to 
foundation performance assessment offers 
one such opportunity, and we know there are 
more experimenting to be done, more learn-
ing to be accumulated, and many stories to 
be shared. s
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